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UNRECOGNIZED VICTIMS: SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
AGAINST MEN IN CONFLICT SETTINGS UNDER 
INTERNATIONAL LAW
DUSTIN A. LEWIS
1
INTRODUCTION
Sexual violence against men as a constituent element of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes often goes under noticed, 
under prosecuted, and, ultimately, under punished.
2  To date, this issue 
has received relatively short shrift in international conventions,
3 the juri-
sprudence of international tribunals,
4 and the writings of learned public-
ists.
5  The lack of recognition, enforcement, and analysis stems from—
                                                          
1 Junior Associate, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research (HPCR) at Harvard 
University.  LL.M. summa cum laude in International Law of Human Rights and Criminal Jus-
tice, Utrecht University School of Law, 2008; A.B. cum laude, Harvard College, 2005.  Former 
Visiting Professional, Chambers of the International Criminal Court, The Hague, 2008.  This ar-
ticle developed out of my LL.M. thesis, for which professors Terry D. Gill and Héctor Olásolo 
served as co-advisers.Comments from Helen Fyfe, Jennifer Jude, Krista Lee-Jones,  Kathleen 
Maloney-Dunn, Suzanne Siu, Brian Wong, and Journal staff enhanced the final version. The 
views expressed herein are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect the views of 
HPCR, the ICC, or any other person or entity.  Any errors or omissions are the author’s alone.
2 While  armed  conflict  is  not  a  necessary  condition  for genocide  or  crimes  against  humanity 
(though it is for war crimes), throughout this article I examine sexual violence against men in the 
specific context of armed conflict.  I do so, firstly, because there is substantial overlap in the 
causes and consequences of sexual violence against men in each of these three international 
crimes, and, secondly, because the current literature does not identify many, if any, relevant dis-
tinctions between and among such violence when perpetrated as a constituent element of geno-
cide, of crimes against humanity, and of war crimes.  Moreover, as a practical matter, genocide 
and crimes against humanity (or the impending threat of either) have historically been accompa-
nied by armed conflict.  For the specific contextual elements of each set of crimes, see infra Sec-
tions III.A (genocide), III.B (crimes against humanity), and III.C (war crimes), respectively.
3 See infra Sections II.B–C.
4 See infra Sections III.A–C.
5 Sandesh Sivakumaran is an exception.  His groundbreaking recent work introduces many of the 
issues I expound upon here.  See Sandesh Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence Against Men in Armed 
Conflict, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 253 (2007) [hereinafter Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence]; Sandesh 
Sivakumaran,  Male/Male  Rape and the ‘Taint’ of Homosexuality, 27  HUM. RTS. QTY. 1274 
(2005) [hereinafter Sivakumaran, Male/Male Rape].  Hilmi Zawati also sketches some of these 
issues.  Hilmi M. Zawati, Impunity or Immunity: Wartime Male Rape and Sexual Torture as a 
Crime Against Humanity, 17 TORTURE 27, 27–47 (2007).LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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among other things—false assumptions about the frequency and the na-
ture of these crimes.
6
This article argues that to reduce and prevent sexual violence 
against men in conflict settings
7 international law should be interpreted, 
applied, and enforced in ways that delegitimize the prejudicial and dis-
criminatory conceptions of gender, sex, and (homo)sexuality that fuel 
such violence in the first place.  A primary way to do so is to use a defi-
nition of sexual violence that includes violence targeting an individual’s 
imputed, perceived, or actual sexuality.
Section  I  elucidates  phenomena  pertaining  to  sexual  violence 
against men in armed conflict, including its causes and consequences.  In 
doing so, Section I isolates the destructive conceptions of gender, sex, 
and (homo)sexuality that may provide motivation to the perpetrators, and 
the particular stigma that can attach to male victims.  Section II assesses 
international law pertaining to  sexual violence in conflict settings.  It 
demonstrates that international instruments and customary international 
law have developed in ways that often exclude, whether explicitly or im-
plicitly, men as a class of victims of sexual violence in armed conflict.  
Nonetheless,  Section  III  details  how  prosecutors  can  use  capaciously 
worded conventional and jurisprudential standards to pursue perpetrators 
of sexual violence against men in conflict settings, as constituent ele-
ments of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.  The article 
concludes by suggesting that, to further enhance the protection interna-
tional  law  provides  to  all  victims  of  sexual  violence,  policy-makers 
should incorporate men explicitly into international instruments pertain-
ing to sexual violence, and promote a jus cogens norm that encompasses 
all forms of sexual violence against women and men.
Four component parts of this article merit definition at the outset 
(1) sexual violence (2) against men (3) in conflict settings (4) under in-
                                                          
6 See infra Sections I.A–B.  This is not to suggest that women do not also remain intolerably ex-
posed to sexual violence in armed conflict.  See generally Kelly D. Askin, Prosecuting Wartime 
Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes Under International Law: Extraordinary Advances, En-
during Obstacles, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 288, 305–47 (2003) [hereinafter Askin, Prosecuting 
Wartime Rape]; ANNE-MARIE L.M. DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE ICC AND THE PRACTICE OF THE ICTY AND THE ICTR (2005).  Rather, 
the narrower point is that, as will be shown, international law does not fully or adequately recog-
nize that men, too, are vulnerable to sexual violence in armed conflict.
7 I use the terms “war” (and similarly “wartime”), “armed conflict,” “conflict situations,” and 
“conflict settings” interchangeably.  I nonetheless recognize that “war” has a specific legal mean-
ing that can be distinguished, in part, by whether a State has expressly declared a war, from the 
other largely synonymous terms I use.  See L.C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 1–2, 44,54–55 (2d ed. 2000).LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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ternational law.  This article uses the following definition of sexual vi-
olence:  any  violence,  whether  physical  and/or  mental,  carried  out 
through sexual means or by targeting sexuality.
8  Drawn from a United 
Nations’ report, this definition is appropriately broad.  It embraces “both 
physical and psychological attacks directed at a person’s sexual characte-
ristics,”
9 while also encompassing “all serious abuses of a sexual nature 
inflicted upon the physical or moral integrity of a person by means of 
coercion, threat of force or intimidation in a way that is degrading and 
humiliating for the victim’s dignity.”
10  As will become apparent, an ade-
quate definition of sexual violence against men must include targeting 
(homo)sexuality, whether imputed, perceived, or actual, in order to rec-
ognize and delegitimize a principal motivation that may fuel such vi-
olence.
With  respect  to  men,  this  article  encompasses  both  boys  and 
adult men.
11  Focus is placed on men because, while both men and wom-
en suffer sexual violence in situations in which genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes take place, the issue has been substantially less 
addressed with respect to men than it has with women.
12  This disparity 
                                                          
8 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of 
Minorities, Contemporary Forms of Slavery: Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like 
Practices during Armed Conflict: Final Report submitted by Gay J. McDougall, Special Rappor-
teur, ¶ 21, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998) (citing M. Cherif Bassiouni et al., 
Sexual Violence: An Invisible Weapon of War in the Former Yugoslavia, Occasional Paper No. 
1, at 3 (Int’l Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul Univ. College of Law 1996)) [hereinafter Fi-
nal Report].
9 Id. ¶ 21 (citing HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, SHATTERED LIVES: SEXUAL VIOLENCE DURING 
THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE AND ITS AFTERMATH 62 (1996)).  I use “sexual violence” instead of 
“sexualized violence” because the former is more recognized in common usage than the latter.  
Nonetheless, “sexualized violence” may provide a more accurate description of this class of 
crimes.  As some commentators note, the term “crimes of sexualized violence” may be broader 
and unite under a single heading the two violations a victim of sexual violence suffers: the in-
fringement of his sexual autonomy and the invasion of his physical or mental integrity.  See, e.g.,
Wolfgang Schomburg & Ines Peterson, Genuine Consent to Sexual Violence Under International 
Criminal Law, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 121, 126–27 (2007) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter 
Schomburg et al.].
10 David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a Norm of Jus 
Cogens: Clarifying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 219, 225–26 (2005) (citing Pros-
ecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 186 (Dec. 10, 1998)).  For a non-
exhaustive list of the types of sexual violence perpetrated against men, see infra Section I.B.
11 As discussed below, international conventions sometimes provide boys more protection against 
sexual violence than adult men by extending enhanced explicit protection to women and to child-
ren (and therefore to both girls and boys).  Nonetheless, this enhanced conventional protection is 
found often only in the preambulatory portion of the instrument and may not extend to the opera-
tive portion.  See infra note 94.
12 I do not mean to suggest that transgendered or intersex persons do not also suffer sexual violence 
in armed conflict and in peacetime.  One peacetime example of such violence comes from South 
Korea, where two men raped a male-to-female transgender person.  There, the nation’s highest LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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in attention may flow from the proportionally greater number of women 
sexually violated in conflict settings.  Yet, regardless of the ratio and the 
aggregate numbers,
13 sexual violence against men in such settings is a 
documented  fact
14 and  remains  inadequately  scrutinized.    As  will  be 
shown, effectively addressing sexual violence against women and men in 
armed conflict is not an either/or proposition, but it is a necessity for 
both.
15
As for conflict settings, this article incorporates both internation-
al and non-international armed conflicts.
16  International armed conflicts 
may exist “whenever there is resort to armed force between two or more 
States.”
17  Non-international armed conflicts may be defined as:
                                                                                                                                 
court held that under municipal law rape is proscribed only when perpetrated against chromo-
somal females, and therefore the two men were guilty not of rape but of a lesser form of sexual 
assault.  In Korea, Male to Female Transsexuals Cannot be Raped . . . Or So Government Says, 
REUTERS NEWSWIRE, June 15, 1996, in MICHAEL SCARCE, MALE ON MALE RAPE: THE HIDDEN 
TOLL OF STIGMA AND SHAME 79–80 (1997).  In this regard, it is of interest to note that the over-
whelming majority of international instruments that address gender- or sex-related bias recognize 
explicitly and exclusively two sexes (men and women; male and female).  These instruments the-
reby fail to heed forceful criticism by biologists that this men-women (or “sexual dimorphism”) 
conception of sex difference does not accurately encompass the full range of chromosomal dis-
parities.  See generally ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS  AND 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY (2000).
13 Which, for reasons addressed below, are currently difficult to obtain and are of questionable va-
lidity. See infra notes 48–53 and corresponding text.
14 See infra Section I.B.
15 As a matter of semantics, it is important to note that, in human rights law especially, a miscon-
ception often causes confusion by conflating the terms “sex” and “gender.”  These terms are not 
interchangeable; generally, and at the risk of cascading into reductionism, sex refers to biological 
categories of male and female, while gender refers to socially constructed notions of masculinity 
(or maleness) and femininity (or femaleness).  See generally FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 12.  
Yet in many human rights instruments, “gender-based violence” appears to denote only and al-
ways violence perpetrated against women, thereby merging “gender” with “sex.”  In this way, 
“gender-based violence,” as currently conceived and applied in many human rights instruments, 
describes only female victimization and implicitly excludes (even the possibility of) male victi-
mization.
16 I exclude post-conflict situations from my analysis.  As such, I do not address the issue of sexual 
violence committed by U.N. peacekeepers and aid workers, especially, though not exclusively, 
against children.  For a recent report on the prominence of sexual violence committed by U.N. 
peacekeepers  against  children, see CORINNA  CSÁKY, SAVE  THE  CHILDREN  UK, NO  ONE  TO 
TURN  TO: THE  UNDER-REPORTING  OF  CHILD  SEXUAL  EXPLOITATION  AND  ABUSE  BY  AID 
WORKERS  AND  PEACEKEEPERS  (2008),  available  at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/27_05_08_savethechildren.pdf.
17 INT’L  COMM. OF  THE  RED  CROSS  (ICRC), OPINION  PAPER: HOW  IS  THE  TERM  “ARMED 
CONFLICT” DEFINED  IN  INTERNATIONAL  HUMANITARIAN  LAW? 5  (2008)  [hereinafter  ICRC, 
Opinion  Paper],  available  at  http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/armed-conflict-
article-170308/$file/Opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.  This definition is predicated  on Com-
mon Article 2 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the ICRC’s authoritative commentary there-
to.  See Jean S. Pictet, Commentary on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1848, Volume I:LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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[P]rotracted  armed  confrontations occurring  between  governmental 
armed forces and the forces of one or more armed groups, or between 
such groups arising on the territory of a State [party to the Geneva 
Conventions].  The armed confrontation must reach a minimum level 
of intensity and the parties involved in the conflict must show a min-
imum of organization.
18
Non-international armed conflicts can be distinguished from internal dis-
turbances, tensions, and isolated or sporadic acts of violence, which do 
not rise to the level of an armed conflict.
19
As for its legal parameters, this article focuses primarily on two 
overlapping  subcategories  of  public  international  law: international 
criminal law (ICL) and international humanitarian law (IHL).  ICL can 
be thought of as a body of rules (1) that proscribes international crimes, 
(2) that imposes upon states the obligation to prosecute and punish some 
of these crimes, and (3) that regulates international proceedings for pros-
ecuting individuals accused of these crimes.
20  IHL can be formulated as 
the laws and customs that seek to limit the effects of armed conflict for 
humanitarian reasons, by protecting persons who are not or who are no 
longer participating directly in hostilities and by restricting the means 
and methods of warfare.
21  The article also examines briefly relevant mu-
nicipal  law  and international  human  rights  law—the  latter  conceived 
                                                                                                                                 
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field 32 (1952).
18 ICRC, Opinion Paper, supra note 17, at 5.
19 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1(2), June 8, 1997, 1125 U.N.T.S. 
609 [hereinafter Protocol II].
20 ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 15 (2003).
21 This definition is drawn from the INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, WHAT IS INTERNATIONAL 
HUMANITARIAN  LAW? (2004), available  at 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/humanitarian-law-
factsheet/$File/What_is_IHL.pdf.  The primary international conventions composing IHL are as 
follows: Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with Annex, 
July 29, 1899, 1 Bevans 247, 187 Consol. T.S. 429; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and 
Customs of War on Land, with Annex, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [he-
reinafter 1907 Hague Convention]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of 
the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 
31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the 
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Ge-
neva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time 
of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protec-
tion of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
Protocol I]; Protocol II, supra note 19.  See infra Section II.C.LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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broadly as the international system of norms, legal standards, and en-
forcement mechanisms that safeguards individuals’ fundamental rights 
against abuse by states.  In comparing relevant municipal law to IHL, the 
article finds a disturbing paradox:  male victims of same-sex sexual vi-
olence who live in countries where male-male sexual behavior is pro-
scribed as a criminal violation enjoy greater legal protection in wartime 
than in peacetime.  In addition, the article highlights how international 
human rights law often excludes men as a category of potential victims 
of sexual violence in wartime.
22
I. PHENOMENA OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST MEN
IN ARMED CONFLICT
This Section outlines the causes, the scale and types of abuses, 
and the consequences of sexual violence against men in armed conflict.  
In doing so, it finds, among other things, that destructive conceptions of 
gender, sex, and (homo)sexuality can provide motivation to commit sex-
ual violence against men in such settings.  Based on this finding, the Sec-
tion argues that one way to prevent and reduce sexual violence against 
men is to use a definition of sexual violence that includes violence target-
ing an individual’s imputed, perceived, or actual sexuality.
A. CAUSES AND UNDER-REPORTING
Political scientists, psychologists, and sociologists have isolated 
some factors that help explain what facilitates and causes sexual violence 
in armed conflict.  In such settings, sexual violence may occur for rea-
sons of personal gratification,
23 as a by-product of supposedly necessary 
military training,
24 or in a more instrumental capacity—for example, as a 
reward offered to soldiers for participating in conflict in the first place.
25  
Some scholars and clinicians posit that sexual violence—regardless of 
                                                          
22 For recent examinations of the relationship between international humanitarian law and interna-
tional  human  rights  law,  see RENE  PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL  HUMAN  RIGHTS  AND 
HUMANITARIAN LAW (2002); Hans-Peter Gasser, International Humanitarian Law and Human 
Rights Law in Non-International Armed Conflict: Joint Venture or Mutual Exclusion?, 45 GER.
Y.B. INT’L L. 149–62 (2002).
23 Elisabeth Jean Wood, Variation in Sexual Violence During War, 34 POLITICS & SOC’Y 307, 
321–23 (2006).
24 Id. at 326–27.
25 Id. at 325–28.LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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the sex or gender of the victim or of the setting—may be motivated sig-
nificantly less by sexual gratification than by an attempt to exert power 
and dominance over the victim and potentially the victim’s community.
26
Sexual violence in conflict settings, in particular, may flow from 
the  “gendered”  nature  of war.
27    According  to  scholar  Elisabeth Jean 
Wood:
The gendered formation of soldiers . . . rests on particular ideas about 
manhood:  leaders persuade soldiers that to be a real man is to assert 
a militaristic masculinity.  One result of such practices is that soldiers 
then represent the domination of the enemy in a gendered way, lead-
ing to the use of specifically sexual violence against enemy women 
and,  occasionally, against enemy  men  who are dominated through 
male rape and castration.
28
The question arises as to what extent, if any, male-male
29 sexual violence 
in armed conflict implicates the sexual orientation of the victim and the 
perpetrator.
30
In examining male-male sexual violence in conflict settings, it 
becomes crucial to recognize that the perpetrator may gain power and 
dominance through a complex psychosocial process in which homosex-
ual and/or feminine attributes are imputed to the male victim—attributes 
that may obtain a larger, even more damaging significance in wartime.  
Interestingly, if not unexpectedly, such attributes are ironically often not 
imputed  to  the  perpetrator  himself.
31    Given  these  considerations,  it 
                                                          
26 A. NICHOLAS GROTH, MEN WHO RAPE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE OFFENDER 2 (1979); SUSAN 
BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 3 (1975); SCARCE, supra note 
12, at 10.
27 JOSHUA S. GOLDSTEIN, WAR AND GENDER: HOW GENDER SHAPES THE WAR SYSTEM AND VICE 
VERSA 356–60 (2001).
28 Wood, supra note 23, at 326 (emphasis in original) (citing GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, at 356–
60).
29 Women can, of course, also commit sexual violence against men in armed conflict.  See, e.g.,
infra notes 61 and 70 and corresponding text.
30 I use the terms “victim” and “survivor” interchangeably; it is important to note, however, that not 
all victims of sexual violence survive.
31 This asymmetry tracks cultural norms in which only one participant (the receptive partner) in 
(both consensual and coerced) male-male insertive anal sex is viewed as feminine and/or homo-
sexual while the other participant (the insertive partner) is viewed not as feminine or homosex-
ual, but as masculine.  As scholar Brad Epps explicates in a discussion of social and political 
constructions of, among other things, gender and sexuality during the Cuban Revolution:
Designating less a libidinal relationship between individuals of the same gender than 
a particular role, position, or style of behavior, homosexuality, male homosexuality 
that is, primarily designates those men who exhibit “feminine” traits or otherwise 
show that they assume so-called passive or receptive positions in sexual intercourse.  
The maricon, very much more than the “active,” “insertive,” “masculine-acting” bu-
garron is here the subject in question.  The latter indeed is a figure who, as Roger LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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would be inaccurate to say there is no “gay” or “homosexual” component 
to male-male sexual violence.  To the contrary, it is in part precisely be-
cause of the potential negative effect of imputing a “gay” identity or 
“homosexual” behavior to  the  victims  that  male-male  sexual  violence 
can be so psychologically and emotionally damaging—in  addition, of 
course, to the physical harm, which occurs regardless of the perpetrator’s 
motivation.
Due to destructive stereotypes of femininity and masculinity, as 
well as to equally destructive prevailing social norms that denigrate ho-
mosexuality, homosexual and feminine attributes can be, and often are, 
conceived as weakness.
32  In turn, this perceived weakness (evident dur-
ing peacetime, but all the more so during wartime) can lead not only to 
dishonor, but ultimately to death.
33  In these ways, the emasculating ef-
fect of sexual violence against men may therefore be exacerbated in war-
time.  Moreover, the male victim perceives an incompatibility with his 
masculinity and his victimization; likewise, he may also perceive his in-
ability to protect himself and his broader community as a confidence-
shattering personal failing.
34
The issue of sexual gratification in male-male sexual violence 
may also be significant, due to some victims’ physical response during 
the abuse.  For example, some male victims of sexual violence, regard-
less of their sexual orientation, may experience a sexual response (such 
as an erection or ejaculation) during the assault.
35  If the victim equates a 
sexual response with pleasure, he may experience sexual-orientation con-
fusion, and perceive himself to be homosexual, thereby aggravating the 
                                                                                                                                 
Lancaster puts it, is not, or not necessarily, “labeled” or “stigmatized” as homosexual, 
and who may even find his masculinity reinforced by penetrating other men.  This is a 
crucial point, pointing to a difference between homosexuality as generally understood 
and experienced in, on the one hand, North America and Western Europe and, on the 
other hand, Latin America and the Middle East.
      Brad Epps, Proper Conduct: Reinaldo Arenas, Fidel Castro, and the Politics of Homosexuality, 
6 J. HIST. SEXUALITY, 232–33 (1995) (internal citations omitted).
32 Male victims of sexual violence may be “tainted” with homosexuality and thereby “emascu-
lated.”  See generally Sivakumaran, Male/Male Rape, supra note 5.  See also GOLDSTEIN, supra 
note 27, at356–60.
33 GOLDSTEIN, supra note 27, at356–60.
34 Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence, supra note 5, at 255 (asserting “it may be argued that [the per-
ceived incompatibility between the victim’s masculinity and victimization] would apply a forti-
ori in an armed conflict, where men tend to self-identify with masculine stereotypes more strong-
ly”).  For more on the various consequences of sexual violence against men in conflict settings, 
see infra Section I.C.
35 Jayne Walker, John Archer & Michelle Davies, Effects of Rape on Men: A Descriptive Analysis, 
34 ARCHIVES OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 69, 76 (2005) [hereinafter Walker et al., Effects of Rape].LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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effects of the abuse if he conceives of homosexual behaviors as an indi-
cator of weakness.
36
The aforementioned destructive stereotypes and norms also im-
pede accurate and full reporting by men of sexual violence in conflict 
settings, thereby precluding an accurate assessment of the depth and se-
verity of the problem.  In short, underreporting results from the shame, 
confusion, guilt, fear, and stigma that flow from imputing a homosexual 
and/or feminine identity onto a man in combat.
37  Other factors that lead 
to non or partial recognition include:  a tendency for men to associate 
their victimization as incompatible with their masculinity
38 and a lack of 
vocabulary to describe their sexual violence.
39  Regarding the latter, for 
example, castration may be classified not as castration as such, but only 
as “abuse” or “torture,” thereby eliding the more specific violation.
40  As 
a consequence, some men who experience sexual violence do not have 
words at their disposal to express their trauma precisely.
41
In the same vein, front-line points of contact for male victims of 
sexual violence in conflict settings—including doctors, counselors, and 
humanitarian workers—may not expect abuse or recognize signs of it.
42  
Those who are aware of the problem may focus on male rape to the ex-
clusion of other forms of sexual violence.
43  Moreover, as discussed be-
low, if the male survivor does not accurately explain what happened, he 
may expose himself to criminal charges, even as a victim of sexual vi-
olence
44—a highly troubling situation that has a tremendous potential to 
                                                          
36 Id. at 76; M. Peel, A. Mahtani, G. Hinshelwood & D. Forrest, The Sexual Abuse of Men in De-
tention in Sri Lanka, 355 THE LANCET 2069, 2069–70 (2000).
37 Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence, supra note 5, at 255.
38 Elizabeth A. Stanko & Kathy Hobdell, Assault on Men: Masculinity and Male Victimization, 33 
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 400, 403–04 (1993).
39 Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence, supra note 5, at 255–56.
40 Eric Stener Carlson, Sexual Assault on Men in War, 349 THE LANCET 129 (1997).  Recognizing 
and prosecuting sexual violence as both the general category of crime (e.g., “torture”) and the 
particular type of crime (e.g., “mutilation”) would reflect the totality of the offense.  See Siva-
kumaran, Sexual Violence, supra note 5, at 256.
41 See generally Torbjørn Herlof Andersen, Speaking About the Unspeakable: Sexually Abused 
Men Striving Toward Language, 2 AM. J. MEN’S HEALTH 25 (2008).  See also Sivakumaran, 
Sexual Violence, supra note 5, at 255 (noting that “[e]ven if male survivors did wish to talk 
about the abuse they suffered, they may find that, as victims also of masculine stereotypes, they 
do not have the right words to express themselves”) (internal citations omitted).
42 Pauline Oosterhoff, Prisca Zwanikken & Evert Ketting, Sexual Torture of Men in Croatia and 
Other Conflict Situations: An Open Secret, 12 REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH MATTERS 68, 68 (2004).
43 Eric Stener Carlson, The Hidden Prevalence of Male Sexual Assault During War: Observations 
on Blunt Trauma to the Male Genitals, 46 BRIT. J.CRIMINOLOGY 16, 18 (2006).
44 See infra Section II.A.LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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dissuade male victims from reporting their abuse in the first place.
45  Inte-
restingly,  however,  one  commentator  notes  that  while  reporting  chal-
lenges  can  be  compounded  during  war,  the  general  social  disruption 
caused by war can, alternatively, lead to an increase in reporting of sex-
ual violence.
46
For the foregoing reasons, it becomes clear that, to reduce and 
prevent sexual violence against men in conflict settings, a sufficient defi-
nition of sexual violence must include, among other things, violence tar-
geting an individual’s (imputed, perceived, or actual) sexuality.  Such a 
definition would recognize and delegitimize the root causes of this type 
of violence, namely the aforementioned harmful stereotypes and norms 
pertaining to gender, sex, and (homo)sexuality.
B. BREADTH ANDTYPES OF ABUSES
This subsection details the breadth and types of abuses pertain-
ing to sexual violence against men in armed conflict.  While exact num-
bers are hard to come by, the breadth and types of abuses encompass vi-
olations such as anal rape, genital mutilation, and enforced masturbation, 
and span from ancient times to the modern day.
The breadth of sexual abuses suffered by men in armed conflict 
seems practically and frighteningly unlimited.  As scholar Sandesh Siva-
kumaran aptly summarizes:
[Sexual violence against men in armed conflict] is not limited to any 
particular part of the world.  It is not confined to state forces, armed 
opposition groups, or private contractors . . . The range of sexual vi-
olence committed against men in armed conflict crosses the full ga-
mut of possibilities; all permutations and combinations are present.
47
                                                          
45 Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence, supra note 5, at 256 n.11 (drawing a parallel with “female vic-
tims who have been unable to prove they have been raped being subjected to charges of adul-
tery”).
46 Wood, supra note 23, at 318–19.
47 Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence, supra note 5, at 257–58 (stating that sexual violence against men 
in conflict situations has  occurred in Ancient  Persia; the Crusades;  Ancient Greek,  Chinese, 
Amalekite, Egyptian, and Norse armies; conflicts in El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Argentina, 
Greece, Northern Ireland, Chechnya, Turkey, former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Iraq-Kuwait, Coali-
tion-Iraq, Sino-Japanese War, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Sudan, the Central African Repub-
lic, Burundi, Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Zimbabwe, and South 
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Nonetheless,  as  with  sexual  violence  against  women,
48 exact 
numbers regarding the incidence of sexual violence against men in armed 
conflict are difficult to ascertain, in part due to underreporting and non-
recognition.
49  However, in one assessment, of the 5,000 male inmates at 
a  concentration  camp  in  Sarajevo  Canton,  80 percent  reported  being 
raped.
50
The peacetime municipal context, while by no means a perfect 
analogy,  may  shed  some  light  on  the  prevalence  of  sexual  violence 
against men in conflict settings. The Center for Disease Control and Pre-
vention and the  National Institute of Justice  found that in  the United 
States (U.S.), men comprise 15 percent of victims of sexual assaults, that 
92,700 adult men are forcibly raped each year, and that approximately 3
percent (or, at the time of the study, roughly 2.78 million men) had expe-
rienced attempted or completed rape in their lifetime.
51  Police data from 
England and Whales tends to indicate that males constitute 7.5 percent of 
all reported rape victims.
52 According to one analysis of 120 prevalence 
studies, 3 percent of men and 13 percent of women have been raped in 
their lifetime.
53
No exhaustive list of the types of sexual abuses men can suffer in 
conflict settings exists.  Nor is such a list necessarily desirable, for, as 
                                                          
48 For instance, it has been estimated that in the former Yugoslavia, 20,000 women were raped between 
1991 and 1995, while in Rwanda, 250,000 to 500,000 women were raped in a four-month period in 
1994.  For  the  former  Yugoslavia,  see WOMENAID  INTERNATIONAL, WARBURTON  MISSION  II
REPORT, EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  INVESTIGATIVE  MISSION  INTO  THE  TREATMENT  OF  MUSLIM 
WOMEN  IN  THE  FORMER  YUGOSLAVIA  - REPORT  TO  THE  EUROPEAN  COMMUNITY  FOREIGN 
MINISTERS,  para.  14  (Feb.  3,  1993), 
http://www.womenaid.org/press/info/humanrights/warburtonfull.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009). For 
Rwanda, see U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Rwanda Submitted by René Degni-Ségui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 
Under Paragraph 20 of Resolution S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, ¶ 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4.1996/68 (Jan. 29, 
1996).
49 See supra Sections I.A–B.
50 Željka Mudrovčić, Sexual and Gender-Based Violence in Post-Conflict Regions: The Bosnia-
Herzegovina Case (2001), in UNITED  NATIONS  POPULATION  FUND, THE  IMPACT  OF  ARMED 
CONFLICT ON WOMEN AND GIRLS: A UNFPA STRATEGY FOR GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN AREAS 
OF  CONFLICT  AND  RECONSTRUCTION 64  (2002),  available  at 
http://www.unfpa.org/upload/lib_pub_file/46_filename_armedconflict_women.pdf.
51 PATRICIA  TJADEN  & NANCY  THOENNES, NATIONAL  INSTITUTE  OF  JUSTICE  & CENTERS  FOR 
DISEASE  CONTROL  AND  PREVENTION: PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND  CONSEQUENCES  OF 
VIOLENT  AGAINST  WOMEN: FINDINGS  FROM  THE  NATIONAL  VIOLENCE  AGAINST  WOMEN 
SURVEY 3–4 (1998).
52 Catherine Armitage, In a Lonely Place, 12 STUDENT BMJ200 (2004) (internal citations omitted).
53 Brian H. Spitzberg, An Analysis of Empirical Estimates of Sexual Aggression Victimization and 
Perpetration, 14 VIOLENCE &VICTIMS 241, 241 (1999).LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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Nigel S. Rodley observes with respect to torture,
54 “a juridical definition 
cannot  depend upon  a  catalogue  of  horrific practices;  for  it  to  do  so 
would simply provide a challenge to the ingenuity of the torturers, not a 
viable  legal  prohibition.”
55    Nonetheless,  various  forms  of  sexual  vi-
olence against men in conflict settings have been documented.  Included 
among these are oral and anal penetrative rapes with a penis, another 
body part, or an object.
56  The “Taguba Report,” for instance, details al-
legations  of  a  detainee  being  sodomized  with  a  chemical  light  and  a 
broomstick.
57
Another form of sexual violence against men is genital violence 
and mutilation.  An example of this type of violation was relayed expli-
citly in a judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia:
The fourth and last body of evidence relating to this paragraph of the 
Indictment concerns Fikret Harambasic and chronologically follows 
immediately after the attacks on the above three victims.  After G and 
Witness H had been forced to pull Jasmin Hrnic’s body about the 
hangar floor they were ordered to jump down into the inspection pit, 
then Fikret Harambasic, who was naked and bloody from beating, 
was made to jump into the pit with them and Witness H was ordered 
to lick his naked bottom and G to suck his penis and then to bite his 
testicles. Meanwhile a group of men in uniform stood around the in-
spection pit watching and shouting to bite harder.  All three were then 
made to get out of the pit onto the hangar floor and Witness H was 
threatened with a knife that both his eyes would be cut out if he did 
not  hold  Fikret  Harambasic’s  mouth  closed  to prevent  him  from 
screaming; G was then made to lie between the naked Fikret Haram-
basic’s legs and, while the latter struggled, hit and bite his genitals.  
G then bit off one of Fikret Harambasic’s testicles and spat it out and 
was told he was free to leave. Witness H was ordered to drag Fikret 
Harambasic to a nearby table, where he then stood beside him and 
was then ordered to return to his room, which he did.  Fikret Haram-
basic has not been seen or heard of since.
58
                                                          
54 As the ICTY held, sexual violence can constitute torture.  Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. 
IT-96-23-A & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶149–50 (June 12, 2002) [hereinafter Kunarac 
et al., Appeal Judgment].
55 NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 105 (1998) 
quoted in Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No.IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 469 (Nov. 16, 1998) [he-
reinafter Delalić et al., Judgment].
56 For a discussion of the definition of rape in international law, see infra Section III.B.1.
57 MAJOR  GENERAL  ANTONIO  M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE  15-6 INVESTIGATION  OF  THE  800TH  
MILITARY  POLICE  BRIGADE, paras.  8(e),  (g)  [hereinafter  TAGUBA  REPORT],  available  at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/taguba.pdf.
58 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 206 (May 7, 1997) [hereinaf-
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There are many other examples of genital violence and mutilation, in-
cluding allegations made in pleadings by the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina before the International Court of Justice that:
They were hitting me, as well as others, in the testicles, using metal 
hampers, metal bars, kicking with the boots.  My testicles were swol-
len, the size of large oranges . . . Serb torturers would beat us, step or 
jump on us until they tired out.  They were deliberately aiming their 
beatings at our testicles saying “you’ll never make Muslim children 
again.”
59
And, in the same application:
I saw how Muslims were forced to bite each other’s testicles off, their 
mouth filled with testicles and blood, ripped blood vessels sticking 
out of their mouths.  Daily Serb torturers forced Muslim prisoners to 
[explicative] each other, to perform oral sex on each other, forcing 
these bestialities especially among family members, between a father 
and son.
60
Another alleged instance involving genital violence and mutilation—this 
time, reportedly resulting in death—comes from the Democratic Repub-
lic of Congo, where:
In early 2003, under threat of being shot, [a 13-year-old girl] was 
made to participate in an attack on Largu, a Lendu village north of 
Bunia, in the course of which she was ordered to tie the testicles of a 
Lendu prisoner with a wire.  The prisoner died as a result of the mal-
treatment.
61
These examples demonstrate not only the heinous nature and de-
vastating effects of genital violence and mutilation against men in con-
flict settings, but also the range of both the perpetrators and the circums-
tances under which such violence is committed.
                                                          
59 See also Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Oral Proceedings of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (CR 2006/06), 51, available at
      http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/10596.pdf (asserting that “[s]exual violence against  men 
was perpetrated essentially in the detention camps.  There is much testimony describing sexual 
violence of all kinds practised against men, sometimes father and son, sometimes two brothers.  
As noted in the Reply, ‘[s]exual assaults against men took mainly two forms: one is coerced sex-
ual activity with other men, the other is aggression against their virility’”) (internal citations 
omitted).
60 Application of the Genocide Convention, supra note 59, ¶ 44D(h).
61 Katy Glassborow, Call for Lubanga Charges to Cover Rape, INST. WAR & PEACE REPORTING, 
May 12, 2008, http://www.iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=344590&apc_state=henh (last visited Mar. 
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Enforced  sterilization  (including  castration)  is  another  related 
form of sexual violence suffered by men in armed conflict.
62  As is en-
forced masturbation, which allegedly took place in the conflict in Sri 
Lanka,
63 as well as enforced fellatio,
64 which was found to have taken 
place in the former Yugoslavia.  Instances of enforced rape or sexual 
contact (including with a family member or the dead) are also known to 
have been committed against men in armed conflict,
65 as are instances of 
enforced  viewing of  sexual  acts  (including sexual acts  that  involve a 
family member or the dead).
66
Violations of certain cultural norms can also act as sexual viola-
tions  in  wartime.    During  the  conflict  in  Sierra  Leone,  for  example, 
“rebels broke other taboos . . . forcing male family members to rape fe-
male family members or to watch them dance naked or be raped by oth-
ers.”
67  Violations of such cultural norms carry increased shame for the 
victim precisely because these violations combine physical abuse with 
psychological torment.
Generally speaking, at least some of the specific acts of sexual 
violence listed above may also constitute murder and other broader cate-
gories  of  crime  (such  as  torture,  inhumane  and  degrading  treatment, 
etc.).
68  They may take place in custodial situations (such as detention 
centers) and in non-custodial situations (such as during raids).
69  They 
                                                          
62 Application of the Genocide Convention, supra note 59, ¶¶ 44D(c), (h); Tadić, Opinion and 
Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1, ¶ 206; Glassborow, supra note 61.
63 Peel et al., supra note 36, at 2069.
64 Application of the Genocide Convention, supra note 59, ¶ 44D(h); Tadić, Opinion and Judg-
ment, Case No. IT-94-1, ¶ 206.
65 Application of the Genocide Convention, supra note 59, ¶ 44D(h).
66 Id.  Another example is how the sexual violence committed during the “rape of Nanking” was 
not limited to women but was also committed against men, “including rape, the forcing of men to 
have intercourse with family members or the dead, and the forcing of celibate men to have inter-
course.” Wood, supra note 23, at 311.  Forced marriage may also constitute a form of sexual vi-
olence against men (as it can against women).  See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brima et al., Case No. 
SCSL-2004-16-PT, Decision on Prosecution Request for Leave to Amend the Indictment (May 
6, 2004).
67 Wood, supra note 23, at 314 (citing FINAL REPORT OF TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION 
OF SIERRA LEONE, vol. 3B, ch.3, paras. 292–96 (2005); Human Rights Watch, “We’ll Kill You if 
You Cry”: Sexual Violence in the Sierra Leone Conflict 35–42 (Jan. 16, 2003)).  See also Appli-
cation of the Genocide Convention, supra note 59, ¶¶ 44D(c), (h); Tadić, Opinion and Judgment, 
Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶ 206.
68 See infra Sections III.A (genocide), III.B (crimes against humanity), and III.C (war crimes), dis-
cussing broader categories of crime under which certain types of sexual violence may also be 
charged.
69 Some commentators assert that more sexual violence takes place in custodial situations than in 
non-custodial  situations.    Oosterhoff  et  al.,  supra  note  42,  at  69  (citing  to  AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL, A GLIMPSE OF HELL: REPORTS ON TORTURE WORLDWIDE (2002)) (asserting LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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may be perpetrated by men, women, or both.
70  Finally, they may result 
in severe physical trauma.
71
C. CONSEQUENCES
Male survivors of sexual violence committed during conflict sit-
uations may face various short- and long-term consequences.
72  Physical-
ly,  they  may  experience  severe  pain,  sexual  dysfunction—including 
physical impotence, damage to their reproductive capacity, blood in their 
stools, abscesses, ruptures of the rectum, general pains in the rectum, 
sexually transmitted diseases including HIV/AIDS, other genital infec-
tions, and loss of consciousness.
73  As with women who suffer sexual vi-
olence, men who have been sexually violated also suffer more general 
health consequences, such as ongoing aches and general malaise.
74
Emotionally, male victims of sexual violence may suffer long-
term trauma such as anxiety, depression, increased feelings of anger and 
vulnerability, loss of self-image, emotional distancing or desensitization, 
                                                                                                                                 
that “[l]ike other forms of torture, sexual torture usually takes place during the first week of cap-
tivity, most often at night and often when guards are drunk”).
70 Wood, supra note 23, at 325 (noting that “women sometimes participate in sexual violence as in 
Rwanda, where women sometimes incited men to rape, and in Iraq, Guantánamo, and Afghanis-
tan, where U.S. servicewomen played key roles in the sexual humiliation of prisoners”).  See, 
e.g., TAGUBA REPORT, supra note 57; Glassborow, supra note 61.
71 One institution, the World Health Organization, has stated that “[m]ale victims of sexual assault 
are more likely to suffer significant physical trauma than [are] female victims.”  WORLD HEALTH 
ORG., REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH DURING CONFLICT AND DISPLACEMENT, ch. 17 (2000) (citing 
AMERICAN  MED. ASS’N, STRATEGIES  FOR  THE  TREATMENT  AND  PREVENTION  OF  SEXUAL 
ASSAULT  23  (1995)),  available  at  http://who.int/reproductive-
health/publications/conflict_and_displacement/RH_conflict_chapter17.en.html (last visited Mar. 
30, 2009).  The accuracy of that claim is disputable, but the fact that men may suffer tremendous 
physical trauma from sexual violence is borne out by a review of the relevant medical literature.  
See infra Section I.C.
72 Women survivors of sexual violence in conflict settings of course also suffer short- and long-
term consequences.  Indeed, many of the consequences of rape are not sex-specific.  Some that 
are sex-specific include miscarriage due to rape and birth of children from rape; the latter viola-
tion may result in particular harmful consequences in patriarchal societies where the ethnicity of 
the child is that of the father-rapist.  Conceivably, the same effect could be obtained in a matriar-
chal society, where a man could be forced to impregnate a woman.  Yet depending on prevailing 
cultural norms, women may be more likely than men to suffer social ostracization, especially in 
cultures that assign special value to female virginity.  DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 55 (citing 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, supra note 9).
73 Oosterhoff et al., supra note 42, at 71 (citing Harry van Tienhoven, Sexual Violence: A Method 
of Torture Also Used Against Male Victims,10 NORDISK SEXOLOGY 243–49 (1992)).
74 DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 55 (internal citations omitted).LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
16 Wisconsin International Law Journal
self-blame, and self-harming behaviors (including suicide).
75  Psychoso-
matic problems may occur as well, including headache, loss of appetite 
and weight, sleeplessness, palpitations, dizziness, and exhaustion.
76  Mul-
tiple rapes, gang rapes, sexual mutilation, and rapes with objects
77 may 
aggravate these physical and emotional consequences.
78
Psychosocially,  depending  on  prevailing  cultural  norms,  male 
victims of sexual violence in conflict settings may additionally face iso-
lation, abandonment by family members (including wife and children), 
shame, and stigmatization.
79  Related consequences that may occur in-
clude marital problems, social withdrawal, loss of interest in work, inex-
plicable outbursts of anger, and alcohol and drug abuse.
80
D. COMPARING SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN PEACETIME AND WARTIME
Despite  similarities  with  sexual  violence  perpetrated  during 
peacetime, sexual violence committed during wartime entails certain dis-
tinctions.  One such difference is the scale of the potential abuse.  In con-
flict settings, custodial situations and mass displacement can facilitate 
abuse on a larger scale.
81  Another distinction is the potentially enhanced 
effect of group emasculation, which can be devastating not only to the 
individual victim, but also to his community.
82  Perhaps chief among the 
differences  is  the  so-called  “international”  element  of  international 
crimes.
83  To constitute a crime under international criminal law, sexual 
violence must have a sufficient nexus to a genocide, to a widespread or 
systematic attack against a civilian population (for crimes against hu-
manity), or to an armed conflict (for war crimes).
84
A related issue is whether an irrebutable presumption of non-
consent exists for certain individuals in conflict settings.  The ad hoc 
                                                          
75 Oosterhoff et al., supra note 42, at 71.  See generally Walker et al., Effects of Rape, supra note 
35, at 69.
76 Oosterhoff et al., supra note 42, at 71.
77 All of which occurred against women in the Rwandan genocide, among other conflicts.  See gen-
erally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AFRICA, supra note 9.
78 DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 55 (internal citations omitted).
79 See supra notes 31–32 and corresponding text (discussing the homosexual and feminine stigma 
often associated with sexual violence against men).
80 Oosterhoff et al., supra note 42, at 71.
81 See supra note 48 (discussing the scale of rape in the former Yugoslavia and Rwandan conflicts).
82 See supra notes 32–34 and corresponding text.
83 Schomburg et al., supra note 9, at 128 (internal citations omitted).
84 For an explanation of each of these factors, see infra Sections III.A (genocide), III.B (crimes 
against humanity), and III.C (war crimes), respectively.LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
Vol. 27, No. 1 Conflict & Sexual Violence Against Men 17
Tribunals have recently demonstrated a tendency to assume that, due to 
their severity, the situations in which international crimes occur vitiate 
even the theoretical possibility for consensual sexual activity between 
people from adverse parties; this is so especially for sexual activity be-
tween a  combatant and  a non-combatant  from adverse parties.
85    The 
emerging presumption of non-consent in international criminal law has 
met some criticism.  According to law professor Karen Engle, in interna-
tional criminal law, the combination of a definition of rape that presumes 
lack of consent with an irrebuttable presumption that all rape constitutes 
severe pain and suffering may, among other things, diminish the sexual 
agency  of  men  and  women  in  conflict  settings.
86    This  presumption 
would appear to apply equally to same- and different-sex relations.
II. DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
This section details developments in international law relating to 
sexual violence in armed conflict.  To assess the general trajectory of law 
in this field, the section compares IHL to the law in some domestic con-
texts and then analyzes relevant instruments, custom, and principles.  In 
regard to the former, the section finds that, due to the criminalization of 
male-male sexual behavior in some countries, victims of male-male sex-
ual violence in those countries enjoy, perversely, greater legal protection 
in wartime than they do in peacetime.  The section also finds that while 
international human rights law may inadequately protect men from sex-
ual violence, international humanitarian law provides significantly more 
protection.  The section then traces the trajectory of IHL and ICL, noting 
how the definition of rape and other forms of sexual violence have de-
veloped since the mid-nineteenth century, and culminates in a discussion 
of a postulated jus cogens norm prohibiting rape in armed conflict.
A. MUNICIPAL LAW
This subsection demonstrates the relatively greater legal protec-
tion international humanitarian law affords men from some countries in 
armed  conflict  compared to  the  legal  protection  extended  to  them  in 
peacetime.  In short, in some national jurisdictions, male victims of sex-
                                                          
85 See Schomburg et al., supra note 9, at 131.
86 Karen Engle, Feminism and Its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape in Bosnia and Her-
zegovina, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 778, 805 (2005).  Cf. Schomburg et al., supra note 9.LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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ual  violence  in  non-conflict  settings  may  face  criminal  prosecution.
87  
These prosecutions may take place in countries in which male-male sex-
ual behavior is proscribed as a criminal violation.  At last count, eighty-
six countries and six provinces or territorial units criminalize consensual 
adult same-sex sex; of these, seven have legal provisions with the death 
penalty  as  potential  punishment  for  such  acts.
88    As  Sivakumaran  ob-
serves:
If male survivors wished to report the abuse and were able to find the 
words with which to do so, they face the danger of consent being as-
sumed if they are unable to prove the rape.  This may lead to a find-
ing of the victim engaging in consensual homosexual activity, which 
may in turn be a criminal offense under the law of the relevant state.
89
In this regard, it is important to note that during situations of armed con-
flict, international humanitarian law applies as lex specialis and thereby 
displaces municipal laws that provide less protection to persons not (or at 
least no longer) taking direct part in hostilities.
90  As a result, internation-
al humanitarian law provides far greater protection to men who are sex-
ually violated than does municipal law in countries in which all male-
male sex is prohibited.  This is, in part, because international humanita-
rian law does not discriminate negatively on the basis of sex.
91  Accord-
ing to the U.N. Committee of Experts:
Violent crimes of a homosexual nature are not explicitly mentioned 
in international humanitarian law . . . That international humanitarian 
law, insofar as it provides protection against rape and other sexual as-
saults, is applicable to men as well is beyond any doubt as the inter-
national human right not to be discriminated against (in this case on 
the basis of sex) does not allow derogation.
92
                                                          
87 See, e.g., Thanassis Cambanis, In Rape Case, a French Youth Takes on Dubai, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
2007, at Section A, Foreign Desk 1.
88 DANIEL OTTOSSON, INT’L  LESBIAN & GAY ASS’N, STATE-SPONSORED HOMOPHOBIA: A WORLD 
SURVEY OF LAWS PROHIBITING SAME SEX ACTIVITY BETWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS 4 (2008), 
available athttp://www.ilga.org/statehomophobia/ILGA_State_Sponsored_Homophobia_2008.pdf.
89 Sivakumaran, Sexual Violence, supra note 5, at 256 & n.11 (drawing a parallel with “female vic-
tims who have been unable to prove they have been raped being subjected to charges of adul-
tery”).
90 Human rights law may also apply in conjunction with international humanitarian law during con-
flict situations.  See supra note 22 and corresponding text.
91 However, certain provisions of Geneva Convention IV, supra note 21, provide enhanced protec-
tion specifically for women, including pregnant women.  See, e.g., arts. 38(5), 132.
92 U.N. Comm’n of Experts, Annex II: Rape and Sexual Assault: A Legal Study, Final Report of the 
United Nations Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 
(1992), n.4, U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 (Vol. I) (Dec. 28, 1994) [hereinafter Rape and Sexual 
Assault].LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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As a troubling but revealing result, men residing in countries that prohi-
bit  (even  consensual)  male-male  sexual  behavior  are  afforded  greater 
protection against male-male sexual violence in wartime than in peace-
time.
93
B. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
International human rights law provides inadequate legal protec-
tion for adult male victims of sexual violence in part because internation-
al human rights instruments define sexual violence in ways that often ex-
clude  men  from  the  class  of  potential  victims.
94    Rather,  these 
instruments  presume  women  (and  children) to  be the  only  victims  of 
sexual violence.  Part of the problem lies in a conflation of the terms 
“sex” and “gender,”
95 whereby “gender-based violence” becomes syn-
onymous with “sexual violence against women.”
96  Due to the exclusion 
of men from the class of potential victims of sexual violence in these in-
struments, male victims of sexual violence must look to sex-neutral in-
struments for recourse.  Yet, neither the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)
97
nor the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
98
contain an express sexual provision for any of the types of abuse those 
instruments prohibit.  As such, male victims of sexual violence in armed 
conflict may have little effective recourse to extant international human 
                                                          
93 Even relatively liberal societies may have only recently recognized in their criminal laws that 
men can be raped.  For instance, in the United Kingdom, it was only in 1994 that the criminal 
statutes reflected this possibility.  Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33, § 142, 
(Eng.).
94 However, such instruments do not always exclude boys.  Most of the instruments that, for in-
stance, include “women and children” in the preambulatory text (thereby implicitly including 
both female and male children) in the class of potential victims, switch to “women and girls” 
when addressing sexual violence in the operative part of the instrument.  An example is S.C. Res. 
1325 at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).  S.C. Res. 1820, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1820 (June 
19, 2008) expressly recognizes at different points “women and children” and “women and girls”, 
but not also men, as victims of sexual violence in armed conflict.  Cf. the sex-neutral approach of 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, Annex, art. 19(1), U.N. GAOR, 44th 
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49/Annex (Nov. 20, 1989).
95 See supra note 15.
96 For instance, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
defines gender-based violence as “violence that is directed against a woman because she is a 
woman or that affects women disproportionately.”  U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimi-
nation Against Women, General Recommendation No. 19: Violence Against Women, ¶ 6 (11th 
Sess., 1992).  See also supra note 15.
97 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 
adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. No. 100-20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 116 (1988).
98 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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rights instruments.  They have significantly better recourse through in-
ternational criminal and humanitarian instruments.
C. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW
This  subsection  traces  the  trajectory  from  the  mid-nineteenth 
century to the present of international legal protections against sexual vi-
olence in conflict settings. Broadly speaking, in international humanita-
rian law, rape used to be conceived and defined in women-specific terms,
as a crime against property, as a crime of troop discipline, and as a crime 
against family honor.  Now, rape is treated as a crime against the indi-
vidual; indeed, as detailed below, international law has developed to the 
point at which rape now consists of a dual violation (1) of an individual’s 
physical or mental integrity and (2) of an individual’s sexual autonomy.  
Moreover, the number of sexual acts that are codified as international 
crimes  has  increased  to  include  non-penetrative  sexual  acts,  such  as 
forced  nudity.    Finally,  while  often  women-specific,  international  in-
struments are in many cases nonetheless worded capaciously enough to 
implicitly include men as a category of victims.
1. MILITARY CODES
Since at least the fourteenth century, some military codes out-
lawed (implicitly male-female) rape and made violators subject to capital 
punishment.
99  Nonetheless, until recently, rape during conflict was con-
ceived of as an inevitable, if unlawful, consequence of war.  The Lieber 
Code of 1863,
100 which was the first codification of customary interna-
tional laws of land warfare, provided explicit protection against sexual 
violence.  The Lieber Code prohibits rape in two provisions:  Article 37 
and Article 44.  Article 37 gives women special protection by linking
                                                          
99 Theodor Meron, Rape as a Crime Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM. J. INT’L L.
424, 425 (1993) (observing that “[r]ape by soldiers has of course been prohibited by the law of 
war for centuries, and violators have been subjected to capital punishment under national mili-
tary codes, such as those of Richard II (1385) and Henry V (1419)”).
100 Francis Lieber, “Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field,” 
Apr. 24, 1863, reprinted in FRANCIS LIEBER, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 45 (1983) 
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them to family relations.
101 Article 44 classifies rape as a crime of troop 
discipline, yet at the same time appears to recognize the violent character 
of rape.
102
It is important to note that at the time of the Lieber Code, rape 
existed in a conceptual world different from today.  Nonetheless, the ex-
tent and effect of that difference is contestable.  Scholar David S. Mit-
chell contends that in 1863, rape was “closely associated with crimes of 
property rather than crimes against the person.  Hence the phrase ‘rape 
and pillage.’”
103  Mitchell further asserts that “at this stage [in 1863] rape 
remains a property crime perpetuated against man’s honor[,] and . . . it 
was rare to find rape reported as a crime against the person.”
104  Nonethe-
less, Article 44 of the Lieber Code employs sex-neutral terminology, at 
least implicitly prohibiting rape, not only against women, but also against 
men.
2. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
Departing somewhat from the Lieber Code, but building upon in-
ternational documents promulgated in the interim,
105 the 1899 and 1907 
Hague Regulations do not characterize rape as a violent crime.  Rather, 
in  Article 46 of the  1907  Regulations, rape is  conceived  as violating 
“family honor and rights.”
106  Explicitly prohibited in the Lieber Code of 
                                                          
101 Id. art. 37, which provides in pertinent part that “[t]he United States acknowledge and protect, in 
hostile countries occupied by them, religion and morality . . . the persons of the inhabitants, es-
pecially those of women; and the sacredness of domestic relations.  Offenses to the contrary shall 
be rigorously punished.”
102 Id. art. 44, which states that:
All wanton violence committed against persons in the invaded country, all destruction 
of property not commanded by the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sack-
ing, even after taking place by the main force, all rape, wounding, maiming, or killing 
such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty of death, or such other severe pu-
nishment as may seem adequate for the gravity of the offense.
       See also Catherine N. Niarchos, Women, War and Rape: Challenges Facing the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 17 HUM.RTS. Q. 649, 672 n.140 (1995).
103 Mitchell, supra note 10, at 236 n.58 (citing KELLY D. ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN:
PROSECUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 51 (1997)).
104 Id.
105 Included among them was the OXFORD MANUAL OF THE LAWS OF WAR ON LAND, Sept. 9, 1880,
reprinted  in A MANUAL  ON  INTERNATIONAL  HUMANITARIAN  LAW  AND  ARMS  CONTROL 
AGREEMENTS 291, 296 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2000).  See generally ASKIN, supra note 103, at 
35–40.
106 Article 46 of the 1907 Hague Convention, supra note 21, reads, “[f]amily honour and rights, the 
lives of persons, and private property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be res-
pected. Private property cannot be confiscated.”LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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1863, rape was no longer prohibited as such in the Hague Regulations of 
1907.  Though Article 46 of the 1907 Regulations can be read broadly to 
encompass wartime rape against women, it was seldom interpreted in 
this way.
107  Mitchell asserts that “[s]trikingly in this period, the status of 
women is not addressed directly—wartime rape is limited to a crime of 
troop discipline as an illegal but inevitable occurrence during armed con-
flict—and women are perceived as private objects rather than public sub-
jects of law.”
108  Article 46 thereby uses historically contingent language 
and conceptions of legal subjecthood, but it also provides at least some 
express prohibition against rape.
The London Charter of 1945 and the Tokyo Charter of 1946, re-
spectively, do not mention rape or sexual assault, but both do implicitly 
refer to rape and sexual assault under the term “ill treatment.”
109  Rape 
was not prosecuted in Nuremberg,
110 but it was listed in the Tokyo Tri-
bunal’s indictment as “inhuman treatment,” “ill treatment,” and “failure 
to respect family honour and rights.”
111  In this way, the Tokyo Tribunal 
set a precedent for the international prosecution of rape as a war crime.
112  
Nevertheless, the few prosecutions of rape in the Tokyo Tribunal are 
viewed by some as ancillary to the prosecution of other war crimes.
113
The four occupying powers in Germany adopted Control Council 
Law No. 10 in December 1945.
114  The law was established to try war 
criminals whose cases were not adjudicated by the Nuremberg Tribunal 
and whose crimes had a specific locale.
115 Control Council Law No. 10 
expressly  lists  rape  as  an  offense  under  crimes  against  humanity.
116  
While no one was prosecuted under its auspices, Control Council Law 
No. 10 established at least three principles relevant to sexual violence in 
international criminal law (1) that rape on a wide scale could be prose-
                                                          
107 Mitchell, supra note 10, at 237 (internal citations omitted).
108 Id.
109 Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6(b), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 1547, 82 
U.N.T.S 279.  Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East arts. 5(b)-(c), Jan. 
19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 (1968).  M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 348 (1999).
110 Though enforced prostitution was prosecuted in national courts outside Germany.  Meron, supra 
note 99, at 425–26 & 426 n.13.
111 ASKIN, supra note 103, at 180.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 William A. Schabas, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 7 (2007).
115 Mitchell, supra note 10, at 238 n.67.
116 Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against 
Peace and Against Humanity art. II(1)(c), Dec. 20, 1945.LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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cuted as a war crime;
117 (2) that crimes of sexual violence committed dur-
ing peacetime could constitute crimes against humanity;
118 and (3) that 
responsibility for such crimes could not be limited to military personnel 
and, consequently, liability could attach to persons occupying other key 
positions.
119
Geneva Convention IV of 1949, which relates to the protection 
of civilian persons during times of armed conflict, prohibits rape, en-
forced prostitution, and indecent assault explicitly under  Article 27.
120  
Nonetheless, the scope of Article 27 is expressly limited to women vic-
tims,
121 and has a tendency to resurrect harmful stereotypes, including 
that a raped woman is “disgraced” and that rape is a crime against hon-
or.
122  Nonetheless, Article 27 provides a basis to charge rape.
Rape and sexual assault are omitted, however, from Article 147 
of Geneva Convention IV, which lists grave breaches.
123  This may be 
due to the fact that in Geneva Convention IV rape is attached not to the 
category of rights protecting a person’s physical integrity (Article 32), 
but to the provision offering protection for “family rights” (Article 27).
124  
Though rape could be interpreted as falling within Article 147’s prohibi-
tion on the grave breach of inhuman treatment, explicit recognition of 
rape as a grave breach is absent from the Convention.
Recognition of rape as a grave breach would carry significant 
consequences because grave breaches may give rise to universal jurisdic-
tion, which would provide a basis for the investigation and prosecution 
of sexual violence regardless of where and by whom such violence was 
allegedly committed.
125  Classifying rape as a grave breach would also 
serve as a tacit recognition of the gravity of the crime.
126  In this regard, 
Catherine N. Niarchos, former Director General for Human Rights the 
OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, finds that the failure to speci-
fy rape as a grave breach indicates that the treaty drafters thought viola-
                                                          
117 Niarchos, supra note 102, at 677–78 and n.175.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 21, art. 27.
121 Id.
122 Mitchell, supra note 10, at 238 n.69 (citing Niarchos, supra note 102, at 674).
123 Geneva Convention IV, supra note 21, art. 147.
124 Mitchell, supra note 10, at 238 n.69 (internal citations omitted).
125 Marc Weller, Undoing the Global Constitution: UN Security Council Action on the International 
Criminal Court, 78 INT’L AFFAIRS 693, 699 (2002) (asserting that it is “uncontroversial that 
grave breaches of the conventions are also covered by genuine universality in customary law”).
126 Niarchos, supra note 102, at 675.LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
24 Wisconsin International Law Journal
tions such as forcing a person to serve in the forces of a hostile power 
merited more attention than rape.
127
The 1977 Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Convention 
further enhanced protection against sexual violence in conflict settings.
128  
Article  75  of  Protocol  I  employs  sex-neutral  language  in  prohibiting 
“outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault.”
129  Ar-
ticle 76 of Protocol I explicitly prohibits rape against women,
130 while 
Article 4 of Protocol II prohibits rape without regard to sex.
131
Some argue that the Article 76 of Protocol I and Article 4 of Pro-
tocol II suffer fundamental flaws because, in distinguishing sexual as-
saults from crimes of violence, the Protocols do not adequately reflect 
that sexual violence is in fact a violent crime.
132  Tracking similar logic, 
Mitchell notes that both Article 76 of Protocol I and Article 4 of Protocol 
II also reify the gendered stereotype that women need to be “the object of 
special  respect.”
133    Whether these  distinctions,  in  and  of  themselves, 
precluded effective prosecution of  sexual  violence against women  re-
mains unclear.  In this regard, it is important to note that the Protocols 
have not been universally ratified.
134
To date, 108 countries have become party to the Rome Statute,
135
which created the International Criminal Court (ICC).  The Rome Statute 
significantly expands the class of expressly enumerated crimes of sexual 
violence  in  international  law,  and  does so  in  sex-neutral terms.    The 
Rome Statute explicitly classifies “rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnan-
cy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of compa-
                                                          
127 Id. at 674–75.
128 Protocol I, supra note 19, arts. 75, 76 and Protocol II, supra note 21, art. 4.
129 Protocol I, supra note 19, protects individuals not taking direct part in hostilities in international 
armed conflicts.
130 Protocol I, supra note 19, art. 76 states that:  Women shall be the object of special respect and 
shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent 
assault . . . (emphasis added).
131 Protocol II, supra note 21, art. 4(1), provides protection to individuals not taking direct part in 
hostilities in non-international armed conflict.
132 Niarchos, supra note 102, at 674–75.
133 Mitchell, supra note 10, at 239.
134 Niarchos, supra note 102, at 676 (internal citations omitted).
135 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted by the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court on July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; COAL. FOR THE INT’L 
CRIMINAL COURT, FACTSHEET:STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE ACCORDING TO THE UN
GENERAL  ASSEMBLY  REGIONAL  GROUPS (2008), 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/RatificationsbyUNGroup_18_July_08.pdf.LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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rable gravity”
136 as, depending on the situational predicate, crimes against 
humanity and/or war crimes.
137
D. JUS COGENS
In a  2005  law journal  article, scholar David S. Mitchell con-
cludes that “[u]ndeniably, the prohibition of rape as a crime in interna-
tional humanitarian law possesses the character of jus cogens.”
138  Mit-
chell’s conclusion turns on the assertion that “a general norm prohibiting 
rape satisfies the basic sources of international law—treaty, custom, and 
general principles—as well as the objective indicia put forth by the [In-
ternational Law Commission].”
139  A question emerges as to whether the 
jus cogens norm prohibiting rape in armed conflict that Mitchell post-
ulates applies both to women and men, an issue Mitchell does not ex-
pressly address.
Of the large number of normative multilateral agreements and 
resolutions that prohibit rape, most, if not all, do so in sex—or, more ac-
curately, women—specific terms.
140  Moreover, Mitchell’s assertions that 
“the municipal law of every nation in the world outlaws rape as part of 
general custom and rape is frequently condemned in practice of most na-
tions as an obligatory rule of higher international standing,”
141 may not 
hold, at least not to the same extent, for men.  In some countries,
142 both 
the male rapist and his male victim are considered to have committed the 
unlawful act of homosexual sex, which constitutes a crime in many na-
tional jurisdictions.
143  In these countries, non-consent on the part of the 
male rape victim does not vitiate the illegality of having engaged, how-
ever against his will, in male-male sex or sexual violence.  Lastly, while 
international  courts,  regional  tribunals,  and  the  UN  Security  Council 
                                                          
136 Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 7(1)(g).  See infra Section III.B.
137 Rome Statute, supra note 135, arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi).  See infra Section III.C.
138 Mitchell, supra note 10, at 256.
139 Id.
140 See, e.g., Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence 
Against Women (“Convention of Belém do Pará”), U.N. Doc. OEA/Ser.P AG/doc.3115/94 rev.2
(June 9, 1994); U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women art. 4(c), G.A. 
Res. 104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (1993) (declaring 
that states should “[e]xercise due diligence to prevent, investigate and . . . punish acts of violence 
against women, whether those acts are perpetrated by the State or by private persons”).  Though, 
as noted, the Rome Statute employs sex-neutral language.  See supra notes 136–37 and corres-
ponding text.
141 Mitchell, supra note 10, at 256.
142 See supra notes 88–89 and corresponding text.
143 See supra Section II.A.LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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have recognized and applied the prohibition against rape as a jus cogens
norm,
144 most of these instances involved cases of women or girls being 
raped.
Nonetheless, the argument that a jus cogens norm against rape in 
armed conflict encompasses rape not only of women but also of men 
draws support from reference to the general principle of international law 
of non-discrimination.
145  As mentioned earlier, the UN Committee of 
Experts held that it is beyond doubt that the protection international hu-
manitarian law provides against sexual violence extends to men.
146  The 
argument also draws support from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc Tri-
bunals that has found sexual violence against men clearly and indisputa-
bly constituting severe violations of international humanitarian law.
147  It 
draws further support from the ICC’s statute’s sex-neutral approach to 
sexual violence.  As such, it appears that no meaningful distinction can 
be drawn between men and women with regard to the postulated jus co-
gens character of the prohibition of rape in armed conflict.
148
However, such a character may not yet extend to all the other 
forms of sexual violence that are criminalized under international law.  
Much  of  Mitchell’s  analysis  of  international  conventions  depends on 
numerous conventions’ explicit (and perhaps exclusive) prohibition of 
rape as such.  To provide further protection to victims of sexual violence, 
as a matter of de lege ferenda the postulated jus cogens norm prohibiting 
rape should be broadened to cover all other forms of sexual violence that 
international law criminalizes. Lastly, to help ensure its effectiveness, the 
postulated jus cogens norm should use a definition of sexual violence 
                                                          
144 Mitchell, supra note 10, at 256.
145 See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES  OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 546–49 (7th  ed.
2008).
146 Rape and Sexual Assault, supra note 92.
147 See, e.g., Tadić, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T.
148 A jus cogens norm prohibiting the rape of men in armed conflict may have consequences for 
refugee and asylum law, at least to the extent certain countries provide asylum based on a viola-
tion of a jus cogens norm.  This may be especially significant when considered in light of the 
phenomenon of “rape plus,” whereby the perpetrator, while sexually violating the victim, also in-
tentionally infects him with HIV.  See infra note 166 and corresponding text.  In the U.S., for in-
stance, the application of a jus cogens norm against rape during armed conflict, and especially 
against “rape plus,” may override “medical inadmissibility” provisions that prohibit asylum, im-
migration, or temporary visits based on a person’s seropositive HIV status.  See generally Mar-
garet A. Somerville & Sarah Wilson, Crossing Boundaries: Travel, Immigration, Human Rights 
and AIDS, 43 MCGILL L.J. 781–834 (1998).  For an overview of refugee law relevant to sexuali-
ty, see Kristen L. Walker, Evolving Human Rights Norms Around Sexuality, 6 ILSA J. INT’L &
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that includes violence targeting an individual’s imputed, perceived, or 
actual sexuality.
III. CONVENTIONAL STANDARDS AND CASE LAW:  A 
PROSECUTION ROADMAP
This section outlines what charges have been brought and can be 
brought against perpetrators of sexual violence in conflict settings.  The 
section aims to provide a prosecution roadmap sketch, by making refer-
ence to sex-neutral language employed in relevant instruments and juri-
sprudence, regarding what needs to be proven to prosecute various sex-
ual abuses that occur as constituent elements of genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.  The section is divided by category of crime; 
for each (genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes) conven-
tional standards and relevant case law are summarized.  While almost all 
of the extant jurisprudence involves instances of sexual violence against 
women,  unless  otherwise  noted,  the  following  adumbrated  standards 
should logically apply with equal force to acts of sexual violence against 
men.
A. GENOCIDE IN RELATION TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE
Genocide is defined in international law as any of the acts enu-
merated in the 1948 Genocide Convention when “committed with the in-
tent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group, as such.”
149  Sexual violence is not listed as a constituent element 
of genocide in the 1948 Genocide Convention. Nonetheless, as discussed 
below, the ad hoc Tribunals have prosecuted rape and other forms of 
sexual violence as constituent elements of genocide.
The major  substantive provisions of the Genocide Convention 
are considered part of customary international law.
150  Indeed, the prohi-
bition of the crime of genocide has obtained the status of a jus cogens
                                                          
149 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 
U.N.T.S. 277.  The sketch of jurisprudential holdings in Section III draws heavily on the excel-
lent analysis in DE BROUWER, supra note 6.
150 See Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28); Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-
4-T, Judgment, ¶ 495 (Sept. 2, 1998) [hereinafter Akayesu, Judgment]; Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, 
Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 45–46 (Dec. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Rutagan-
da, Judgment and Sentence]; Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-T, Judgment and 
Sentence, ¶¶ 150-51 (Jan. 27, 2000) [hereinafter Musema, Judgment and Sentence]; Prosecutor v. 
Krstić, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 540-41(Aug. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Krstić, Judgment].LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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norm.
151  Pursuant to Articles I and IV of the Convention, states under-
take to prevent and punish genocide, whether committed in peacetime or 
in wartime, and whether committed by rulers, public officials, or private 
individuals.
152
The ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC all incorporated verbatim the 
Convention’s  definition  of  genocide  into  their  respective  statutes.
153  
Therefore, the ad hoc Tribunals and the ICC may prosecute persons who 
committed genocide or any of the participatory forms of genocide.  The 
ICC’s Elements of Crimes
154 also reflect that sexual violence can com-
prise each of the sets of acts and omissions that constitute genocide.  The 
section is subdivided into each of the five sets of acts and omissions pro-
hibited in the Genocide Convention, followed by the mens rea standard, 
which applies to all five sets of acts and omissions.
1. KILLING MEMBERS OF THE GROUP
Sexual violence can serve as the constituent element for purpos-
es of paragraph (a) of the Genocide Convention, which prohibits “kil-
lings members of the group.”
155  In Prosecutor v. Akayesu, an ICTR Trial 
Chamber held that sexual violence is often perpetrated with the intent of 
ultimately causing the victim’s death.
156  Death can result, for example, in 
cases in which a perpetrator makes a person bleed profusely, by inserting 
                                                          
151 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Provisional Measures, Order of 13 September 1993, 1993 I.C.J. 325, 440 (separate opinion of 
Judge ad hoc Lauterpacht); Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 935 (1994), para. 152, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (Annex) (Dec. 9, 
1994).
152 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 260 A (III) 
(Dec. 9, 1948).
153 Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted by S.C. Res. 
827, U.N. Doc. S/Res/827 (May 25, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the Internation-
al Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted by S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/Res/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) [herei-
nafter ICTR Statute]; Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 6.
154 Elements of Crimes, International Criminal Court (ICC)  Doc.  ICC-ASP/1/3 (part  II-B), arts. 
6(a)-6(e)  (Sept.  9,  2002),  available  at  http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-
41D6-AB0B-68E5F9082543/0/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf  [hereinafter  Elements  of 
Crimes].  Art. 9(1) of the Rome Statute, supra note 135, provides that the “Elements of Crimes
shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 6, 7 and 8.”  Art. 9(3) of the 
Rome Statute, supra note 135, moreover, states that “[t]he Elements of Crimes and amendments 
thereto shall be consistent with this Statute.”
155 See generally DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 48–51.  A difference arises here between men and 
women, based on women’s unique capacity to bear children.
156 Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, ¶ 733.LEWIS-FORMATTED 8/29/2009  9:26PM
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sticks into the victim’s vagina
157 (or, by analogy, into the victim’s anus), 
or by mutilating the victim’s breasts
158 or other sexual(ized) body parts.
2. SERIOUS BODILY OR MENTAL HARM
Rape and other forms of sexual violence can also fall under pa-
ragraph (b)’s prohibition on “serious bodily or mental harm.”  As the 
ICTR held in Akayesu, “rape and sexual violence certainly constitute in-
fliction of serious bodily or mental harm on the victims and are even . . .  
one of the worst ways of inflict[ing] harm on the victim as he or she suf-
fers both bodily and mental harm.”
159  Subsequent cases also prosecuted 
sexual violence as genocide under paragraph (b).
160  Likewise, the ICC’s 
Elements of Crimes state in sex-neutral terms that the “serious bodily or 
mental harm” provision in the crime of genocide “may include, but is not 
necessarily restricted to, acts of . . . rape, sexual violence or other inhu-
mane and degrading treatment.”
161  According to one judgment, to rise to 
the level of seriousness under paragraph (b), an act or omission need not 
inflict permanent or irreparable harm, but it must go “beyond temporary 
unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation.  It must be a harm that re-
sults in grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a 
normal and constructive life.”
162  The destruction or partial destruction of 
the group is not required under paragraph (b).
163
                                                          
157 Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 215, 261 (June 17, 2004) 
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3. DELIBERATELY INFLICTING ON THE GROUP CONDITIONS OF LIFE 
CALCULATED TO BRING ABOUT ITS DESTRUCTION
In the ad hoc Tribunals, no charge for rape or sexual violence 
has yet been brought under paragraph (c)’s prohibition on “deliberately 
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part.”
164  Nonetheless, in Prosecutor 
v. Kayeshima and Ruzindana, an ICTR Trial Chamber held that rape can 
constitute one such “condition of life” for the sake of paragraph (c).
165  
Intentionally infecting someone with HIV/AIDS through sexual violence, 
a frequent occurrence in the Rwandan genocide and in other conflicts,
166
which is sometimes called “rape plus,”
167 appears to fall under this provi-
sion as well.
4. IMPOSING MEASURES INTENDED TO PREVENT BIRTHS WITHIN THE 
GROUP
As  with  paragraph  (c),  no  sexual  violence-based  prosecutions 
have been brought in the ad hoc Tribunals under paragraph (d), which 
prohibits  “imposing  measures  intended  to  prevent  births  within  the 
group.”
168  However, the  ICTR articulated circumstances under which 
such charges could be prosecuted.  The Akayesu Trial Chamber held that 
“measures intended to prevent births in the group” may include “sexual 
mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced birth control, separation of 
the sexes and prohibition of marriages.”
169  The Trial Chamber also noted 
that such measures can be physical or mental; one example of the latter is 
when someone who has been raped refuses subsequently to procreate.
170  
The prosecutor need not prove births were actually prevented within the 
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2(d).
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group, but rather, the measures were imposed intentionally to prevent 
births within the group.
171
5. FORCIBLY TRANSFERRING CHILDREN OF THE GROUP TO ANOTHER 
GROUP
The Trial Chamber in Akayesu elucidated how sexual violence 
could  fall  within  the  prohibition  embodied  in  paragraph  (e),  namely, 
“forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”
172  The 
Chamber held that:
as in the case of measures intended to prevent births [paragraph (d)], 
the objective is not only to sanction a direct act of forcible physical 
transfer, but also to sanction acts of threats or trauma which would 
lead to the forcible transfer of children from one group to another.
173
Therefore, acts of sexual violence that serve as such threats or trauma 
may fall within this provision.  Building upon Akayesu, the ICC’s Ele-
ments of Crimes state that:
the term “forcibly” is not restricted to physical force, but may include 
threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, 
duress,  detention,  psychological  oppression  or  abuse  of  power, 
against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advan-
tage of a coercive environment.
174
To incur liability under paragraph (e), the perpetrator must have had the 
intent to forcibly transfer the children from one group to another.  The 
Elements  of  Crimes  clarify  that,  in  the  ICC,  a  perpetrator  needed  to 
know, or should have known, that the person or persons were under the 
age of eighteen.
175
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6. MENS REA
The mens rea standard for genocide consists of three parts (1) 
the degree of intent, (2) the destruction of the group, as such, and (3) the 
“in whole or in part” aspect.
176  The intent requirement makes genocide 
purportedly the “crime of crimes.”
177  To fulfill the “destruction of the 
group, as such” requirement of the crime of genocide, a perpetrator must 
commit the act “against a specifically targeted group.”
178  This require-
ment helps distinguish genocide from crimes against humanity, especial-
ly the crime against humanity of persecution.  Persecution is a crime 
against humanity in which the perpetrator selects his victims based on 
their membership in a specific community.
179  In the crime of genocide, 
the perpetrator must intend to destroy the group, per se.  The Akayesu
Trial Chamber defined the different types of groups recognized by the 
Genocide Convention.  The Chamber defined a national group as “a col-
lection of people who are perceived to share a legal bond based on com-
mon citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of rights and duties;”
180 an eth-
nic  group as  “a  group whose  members  share  a  common  language  or 
culture;”
181 a racial group as “based on the hereditary physical traits often 
identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural, 
national  or religious  factors;”
182 and  a  religious  group  as  “one  whose 
members share the same religion, denomination or mode of worship.”
183  
These distinctions are not airtight, as commentators remark, for instance, 
with respect to false distinctions drawn between Tutsi and Hutu as dispa-
rate ethnic groups.
184  Some legal scholars propose that gender (or sex) be 
added to the list of protected groups.
185
With regard to the third component of genocide (“in whole or in 
part”), as long as the acts were committed with the specific intent to de-
stroy the group, the acts need not lead to the whole, or even the partial, 
annihilation of the group.  However, an ICTY Trial Chamber defined “in 
                                                          
176 See generally DE BROUWER, SUPRANATIONAL PROSECUTION, supra note 6, at 60–75.
177 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case No. ICTR 97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 16 (Sept. 4, 1998).
178 Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, ¶ 499.
179 See infra Section III.B.8.
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181 Id. ¶ 513.
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part”  to  encompass  a  “substantial”  part,  with  substantial  meaning  “a 
large minority of the group in question or the most representative mem-
bers of the targeted community.”
186  The Chamber thereby set a non-
trivial standard for the portion of the group that must be annihilated in 
order to reach the genocide threshold.
B. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN RELATION TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE
As adjudicated in the ad hoc Tribunals and as recognized expli-
citly in the Rome Statute, sexual violence can comprise various crimes 
against humanity.  Crimes against humanity can be distinguished from 
genocide because they do not require that the perpetrator intended to an-
nihilate a protected group, as such.  In addition, crimes against humanity 
can be distinguished from war crimes because crimes against humanity 
do not strictly require a nexus to an armed conflict, but rather require a 
nexus to a widespread or systematic attack against a civilian population.
This subsection is divided into each of the various crimes against 
humanity for which sexual violence can act as the constituent element.  It 
is helpful to note that rape was the only crime of sexual violence listed 
explicitly as stand-alone constituent element in the ICTR’s and ICTY’s 
respective statutes; therefore, in prosecuting sexual violence those Tri-
bunals  sometimes  resorted  to  more  broadly  construed  categories  of 
crimes against humanity (including torture, enslavement, and other in-
humane acts of a similar character).  For its part, as will be shown, the 
Rome Statute explicitly lists acts of sexual violence that comprise crimes 
against humanity (and war crimes, depending on the situational predi-
cate): rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, 
forced pregnancy, and any other form of sexual violence of comparable 
gravity.
1. RAPE
Different chambers within the Tribunals have defined raped dif-
ferently.  The ICTR Trial Chamber in Akayesu, the first such court to de-
fine rape in international criminal law, invoked a conceptual approach, 
defining rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, [which is] com-
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mitted on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”
187  The Trial 
Chamber stressed that:
coercive circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical 
force.    Threats,  intimidation,  extortion  and  other  forms  of  duress 
which prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coer-
cion may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed con-
flict . . . ”
188
An effect of using the term “invasion” instead of “penetration” is that 
rape could encompass acts such as forced masturbation and sexual muti-
lation, neither of which involved physical penetration.
Some chambers in the ICTY have adopted a more mechanical 
definition of rape, first in Prosecutor v. Furundžija and later in Prosecu-
tor v. Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković.  In Furundžija, rape is defined as:
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight (a) of the vagina or anus of 
the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object used by 
the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis of the 
perpetrator;
(ii) by coercion or force or threat of force against the victim or a third 
person.
189
In Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković, the act of rape is again defined 
using a more mechanical approach (in contrast to Akayesu’s more con-
ceptual  approach),  but  in  these  cases  includes  the  element  of  non-
consent:
[rape is] the sexual penetration, however slight (a) of the vagina or 
anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object 
used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the penis 
                                                          
187 Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, ¶ 598.  Later in its decision, the Trial Chamber de-
fined sexual violence as follows:  “The Tribunal considers sexual violence, which includes rape, 
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ment, Case No. IT-96-21-T, ¶¶ 478-79; Musema, Judgment and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-96-
13-T, ¶¶ 220, 226; Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 
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of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs without the 
consent of the victim.
190
The Trial Chamber in Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković clarified that consent 
must be given voluntarily as a result of the victim’s free will.
191  Some 
commentators assail the notion that consent can ever be a factor in a situ-
ation that is inherently coercive,
192 while at least one scholar criticizes the 
Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković Appeals Chamber for purportedly dimi-
nishing sexual autonomy, especially for women, in conflict situations.
193
Recently, the joint Appeals Chamber of the ad hoc Tribunals de-
fined rape by combining the consent element of the Kunarac decision 
with the coercive circumstances element of the Akayesu decision.
194  Ac-
cordingly, prosecutors must prove lack of consent, but they can prove it 
by an assessment of circumstantial evidence alone.
195  The ICC incorpo-
rates the element of force, threat of force, coercion, or a coercive envi-
ronment for the crime against humanity of rape; however, it does not re-
quire lack of consent.
196
As for the mens rea standard for rape as a crime against humani-
ty, in the ICC the prosecutor must prove the accused intended to invade 
the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, 
of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual 
organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or 
any other part of the body.
197  The Prosecutor must also prove that the ac-
cused knew through the surrounding circumstances that the invasion was 
committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, or by taking advan-
tage  of  a  coercive  environment,  or  that  the  invasion  was  committed 
                                                          
190 Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 460 (Feb. 22, 2001), [he-
reinafter Kunarac et al., Judgment].
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peal Judgment, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1-A, ¶¶ 127-28; Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No.
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2006).
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against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.
198  It is unnecessary 
for the prosecutor to prove the perpetrator’s knowledge of the victim’s 
non-consent.
199
2. TORTURE
According to the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, acts of sexual vi-
olence can constitute the crime against humanity of torture if those acts 
fulfill three cumulative criteria.
200  First, the perpetrator must inflict se-
vere pain or mental suffering upon one or more persons.
201  While no 
specific criteria upon which to assess the degree of pain or suffering ex-
ists, the Appeals Chamber in Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković upheld the 
finding that sexual violence can amount to torture because of its inherent 
severity.
202  The second criterion listed in the Elements of Crimes is that 
the tortured person or persons must have been in the custody or under the 
control of the perpetrator.
203  “Custody” here includes any form of deten-
tion in which a person’s liberty is deprived; it encompasses, among other 
situations, arrest by security forces, crowd control by security forces, and 
enforced  disappearances.
204    Situations  where the  victim  had  nowhere 
else to go, even if he was not detained, would fall within this crime.
205  
The third criterion is that “such pain or suffering did not arise only from, 
and was not inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.”
206  “Lawful” 
means controlling international law or domestic law.  However, sexual 
violence can never qualify as a lawful sanction because international law 
prohibits it.
207  In contrast to the war crime of torture,
208 the crime against 
humanity of torture does not require the perpetrator to have committed 
the act for a prohibited purpose.
209
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3. SEXUAL SLAVERY AND ENSLAVEMENT
Unlike the ad hoc Tribunals’ statutes, the ICC’s statute expressly 
lists sexual slavery as a crime against humanity.
210  In accordance with 
the ICC’s largely sex-neutral Elements of Crimes, the actus reus of the 
crime consists of two parts.  The first is that the:
[P]erpetrator exercised any or all of the powers attaching to the right 
of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, sell-
ing, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on 
them a similar deprivation of liberty.
211
The “such as” here, however, does not denote an exclusive list; this is 
clarified in a footnote in the Elements of Crimes, which note that a com-
mercial benefit is not a requirement.
212  The second part is that the “per-
petrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a 
sexual nature.”
213  This  clause distinguishes sexual slavery as a crime 
against humanity from enslavement as a crime against humanity.  The 
mens rea required for sexual slavery as a crime against humanity is that 
the perpetrator intended to exercise “any or all powers attaching to the 
right  of  ownership over  one or  more persons”  and intended to  cause 
“such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual na-
ture.”
214
While the ICC’s statute provides an explicit basis to prosecute 
the crime against humanity of sexual slavery,
215 no such basis existed in 
either of the ad hoc Tribunals’ statutes.  The ICTY nonetheless utilized 
the more broadly construed crime against humanity of enslavement to 
prosecute allegations of sexual slavery.  In Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković, 
the Trial Chamber defined the crime against humanity of enslavement as 
“the exercise of any or all powers attaching to the right of ownership 
over a person. The mens rea of the violation consists in the intentional 
exercise of such powers.”
216 The Trial Chamber found that some of the 
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accused held women in slavery-like situations with a primary aim of rap-
ing them.
217  The Trial Chamber’s decision, which the Appeals Chamber 
substantially upheld, clarified that sexual slavery can constitute the crime 
against humanity of enslavement.
218  As noted above, whereas the ICTY 
and ICTR have applied broad conceptions of enslavement to prosecute 
sexual slavery as a crime against humanity, the ICC’s statute now pro-
vides an explicit basis for sexual slavery as a stand-alone crime against 
humanity.
219
4. ENFORCED PROSTITUTION AND FORCED PREGNANCY
According to the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, the actus reus of 
enforced prostitution as a crime against humanity consists of two ele-
ments.  The first is that the:
[P]erpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or more 
aspects of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, 
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psycholog-
ical oppression or abuse of power, against such person or persons or 
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or 
such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.
220
The second is that the “perpetrator or another person obtained or ex-
pected to obtain pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in con-
nection with the acts of a sexual nature.”
221  The Elements of Crimes, 
therefore,  distinguishes  the  crime  against  humanity  of  sexual  slavery 
from the crime against humanity of enforced prostitution by requiring a 
pecuniary element for that the latter but not for the former.
222  Of the acts 
of sexual violence enumerated in the ICC’s statute, forced pregnancy is 
the only one that is sex-specific, since only women can be victims of the 
crime because only women are capable of becoming pregnant.
5. ENFORCED STERILIZATION
With respect to the ICC’s statute, the crime against humanity of 
enforced sterilization consists of two parts.  The first is that the “perpe-
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trator deprived one or more persons of [his, her, or their] biological pro-
ductive capacity.”
223  The second is that the “conduct was neither justi-
fied by the medical or hospital treatment of the person or persons con-
cerned  nor  carried  out  with  [his,  her,  or]  their  genuine  consent.”
224  
Sterilization need not be permanent to satisfy this definition.
225  Enforced 
sterilization includes surgical removal of the reproductive organs and any 
other means or measures—such as cutting off the genitals or violence 
that destroys the reproductive system—that have the effect of depriving a 
person of his or her biological reproductive capacity.
226  Enforced sterili-
zation may also amount to the crime of genocide if the requisite intent is 
present; in particular, it may fall under paragraph (c) or (d), as discussed 
above.
227
6. ANY OTHER FORM OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE OF COMPARABLE GRAVITY
The residual category of “any other form of sexual violence of 
comparable gravity” allows for the prosecution of crimes against human-
ity for acts of sexual violence that are not expressly listed in the ICC’s 
statute.
228  Three requirements must be fulfilled to charge this residual 
category.
229  The first is that the:
[P]erpetrator committed an act of a sexual nature against one or more 
persons or caused such person or persons to engage in an act of a 
sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that 
caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppres-
sion or abuse of power, against such person or persons or another 
persons, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such 
person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent.
230
This requirement encompasses both acts of a sexual nature committed 
against another person or persons and acts causing a person or persons to 
engage in an act of a sexual nature by (threat of) force or coercion.
The second requirement is that the act reaches a certain gravity 
threshold. According to the Rome Statute, the threshold must be compa-
rable to rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, or 
                                                          
223 Elements of Crimes, supra note 154, art. 7(1)(g)-5-1.
224 Id. art. 7(1)(g)-5-2.
225 DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 146–47.
226 Id.
227 See supra Sections III.A.3–4.
228 Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 7(1)(g).
229 See generally DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 148–51.
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enforced sterilization.
231  Some commentators read the ICC’s statute the-
reby  to  potentially  exclude  forced  nudity  and  sexual  mutilation  from 
“any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity” as a crime 
against humanity.
232  As a corrective measure, these commentators sug-
gest that the ICC interpret the restriction broadly by utilizing the juri-
sprudence of the ICTY and ICTR, which upheld a more capacious defini-
tion of sexual violence as international crimes.
233  The third requirement 
is that the “perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that estab-
lished the gravity of the conduct.”
234
7. OTHER INHUMANE ACTS OF A SIMILAR CHARACTER
The ICTY and the ICTR have held that certain acts of sexual vi-
olence  can  fall  within the  even  broader  category  of  “other  inhumane 
acts.”
235  Given the savings-clause character of this provision in the ICC 
statute,
236 it may be argued that crimes of sexual violence should be pros-
ecuted as the crime against humanity of “other inhumane acts” only if 
those acts do not fall within the more specifically listed crimes against 
humanity relating to sexual violence discussed above.
Whether an act consists of torture or other inhumane acts de-
pends on the degree of pain or suffering:  torture requires severe pain or 
suffering, while other inhuman acts require great suffering or serious in-
jury.
237  Types of sexual violence that have been held to fall within the 
“other inhumane acts” provision include forced fellatio, forced sexual 
mutilation, forced undressing, and forcing women to perform naked in 
public.
238
8. PERSECUTION
Sexual violence may serve as a constituent element of the crime 
against humanity of persecution provided  the  other necessary compo-
nents of the crime of persecution are fulfilled.  According to the ICC’s 
                                                          
231 Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 7(1)(g).
232 DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 148–49.
233 See, e.g., Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, ¶ 697.
234 Elements of Crimes, supra note 154, art. 7(1)(g)-6.
235 See, e.g., Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, ¶ 697.
236 Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 7(1)(k).
237 DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 163.
238 Tadić, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-T, ¶¶ 729-30; Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. 
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Elements of Crimes, to amount to the crime against humanity of persecu-
tion (1) the perpetrator must severely deprive, contrary to international 
law, one or more persons of his, her, or their fundamental rights; (2) the 
perpetrator must target such person or persons by reason of the identity 
of a group or collectivity or target the group or collectivity, as such; (3) 
the targeting must be based on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, 
religious, gender,
239 or other grounds that are universally recognized as 
impermissible  under  international  law;  and  (4)  the  conduct  must  be 
committed in connection with any act referred to in article 7, paragraph 1 
of the Statute or any crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC.
240  A ques-
tion arises as to whether, under the Rome Statute, sexual orientation may 
be invoked as a discriminatory ground for purposes of prosecuting perse-
cution as a crime against humanity.  Although it was mentioned in the 
ICTY Tadić Appeals Chamber judgment,
241 “sexual preference” has not 
yet been recognized conventionally as a prohibited ground of discrimina-
tion for purposes of the crime against humanity of persecution.
242
As to the situational predicate, to constitute a crime against hu-
manity, an act of sexual violence must form part of a widespread or sys-
tematic attack against a civilian population.
243  Under the ICC’s statute, 
the perpetrator must have “knowledge of the attack.”
244  Because no spe-
cific parameters delineate when an attack has reached the widespread or 
systematic threshold, a factual determination of each attack is necessary.  
The ICC thereby requires that the attack involved multiple commissions 
of  prohibited  acts  against  a  civilian  population,  and  that  the  attack’s 
course of conduct occurred pursuant to a specific state or organizational 
policy.
245
                                                          
239 “Gender” as explicitly defined in Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 7(3).
240 Elements of Crimes, supra note 154, art. 7(1)(h).  See also DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 152–
62.
241 Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 285 (July 15, 1999) [hereinafter 
Tadić, Appeal Judgment].
242 Based on the text of art. 7(3) of the Rome Statute, supra note 135, sexual preference would not 
fall under the “gender” heading for the crime of persecution (stating that “gender,” as a protected 
category against persecution, “refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the context of so-
ciety,” and that “[t]he term ‘gender’ does not indicate any meaning different from the above.”).  
See also DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 159.
243 Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 7(1).
244 Id.
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C.  WAR CRIMES IN RELATION TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE
As with genocide and crimes against humanity, acts of sexual 
violence may comprise the constituent elements of war crimes.  Such 
acts can be prosecuted as the specific type of sexual violence (for in-
stance, as forced sterilization), under a broader category of crime (for in-
stance, as torture or inhumane treatment), or both.  The ICC’s statute is 
the most recently established international instrument detailing the defi-
nition and scope of the war crimes of sexual violence.
246  The Rome Sta-
tute’s list and accompanying definitions of the war crimes of sexual vi-
olence are almost identical to its list and definitions of sexual violence 
that constitute crimes against humanity that were just sketched—namely, 
rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, forced 
pregnancy, and any other form of sexual violence that meets a certain 
threshold.
Therefore, this section focuses on highlighting distinctions be-
tween the two (crimes against humanity and war crimes).  It looks in par-
ticular  at  the  two  crimes’  respective  situational predicates.    In  short, 
crimes against humanity require a systematic or widespread attack di-
rected at a civilian population,
247 while war crimes occur during situa-
tions of armed conflict.  According to its statute, the ICC has jurisdiction 
over war crimes “in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy 
or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes.”
248  While distinc-
tions  can  be  drawn  between  international  armed  conflict  and  non-
international armed conflict, the substantive provisions expressly prohi-
biting various forms of sexual violence are similar to each type of con-
flict.  The primary distinction is that for international armed conflicts, 
grave  breaches  of  the  Geneva  Conventions  may  also  be  prosecuted, 
while for non-international armed conflicts, violations of Common Ar-
ticle 3 may also be prosecuted.
249
For international armed conflicts, the ICC’s statute incorporates 
two interrelated bodies of law into its war crimes section.  The first con-
sists of grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocol I.
250  The second consists of serious violations of the laws and 
                                                          
246 Id. arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi).
247 Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 7(1).
248 Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 8(1).
249 Id. arts. 8(2)(a), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(c), and 8(2)(c)(vi).
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customs of war.
251  The latter can be ascertained by reference to customa-
ry international humanitarian law, in particular to the 1899 and 1907 Ha-
gue Convention and Regulations, the  four  1949 Geneva  Conventions, 
and the two 1977 Additional Protocols thereto.
252  Serious violations of 
the laws and customs of war constitute the second ground on which war 
crimes can be prosecuted for armed conflicts of a non-international cha-
racter.
253
1. GRAVE BREACHES (INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT)
Because they are considered to be the most serious violations of 
international humanitarian law, grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Con-
ventions impose universal jurisdiction on states that are party to the Con-
ventions.
254  For violations falling short of the grave breach standards, 
states must “take measures necessary for the suppression” of such acts.
255
In the ICC’s statute, grave breaches consist of any of the enume-
rated acts when committed against a protected person.
256  In accordance 
with the ICTY Tadić Appeal Judgment, a protected person may be of the 
same nationality as the perpetrator so long as he is of the adverse party.
257  
While the 1949 Geneva Conventions fails to list rape in particular as a 
grave breach, the ICTY has charged and prosecuted crimes of sexual vi-
olence, as such, as grave breaches.
258 Two grave breaches, in particular, 
are relevant to the discussion of sexual violence. The first is torture or 
inhuman  treatment,  including  biological  experiments.    The  second  is 
willfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health.
Torture, as a grave breach, requires the infliction of severe pain 
or  suffering,  whether  mental  or  physical,  for  a  prohibited  purpose.
259  
However, the official-capacity requirement, which is found in the Con-
                                                          
251 Id. art. 8(2)(b).
252 See supra notes 19 and 21.
253 The other is serious violations of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, not, 
as with international armed conflicts, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.
254 Geneva Convention I, supra note 21, arts. 49–50; Geneva Convention II, supra note 21, arts. 50–
51; Geneva Convention III, supra note 21, arts. 129–130; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 21, 
arts. 146–147.
255 Geneva Convention I, supra note 21, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 21, art. 50; Ge-
neva Convention III, supra note 21, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 21, art. 146.
256 Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 8(2)(a).
257 Tadić, Appeal Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 166.
258 Furundžija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 172; Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et al., Case No. 
IT-04-84-I, Indictment (Mar. 4, 2005) [hereinafter Haradinaj et al., Indictment].
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vention Against Torture,
260 is absent for war crimes in the ICC. This is 
due to the different natures of public international law, which is predi-
cated largely on acts attributable to the state, and international criminal 
law, which is predicated on attributing acts not to a state but to individu-
als.
261  Although rape and other forms of sexual violence are not listed 
expressly as grave breaches in the Geneva Conventions or in the ad hoc
Tribunals’ respective statutes, both Tribunals held that sexual violence 
can constitute a grave breach of torture and inhuman treatment,
262 as the 
ICTY did for the grave breach of willfully causing great suffering, or se-
rious injury to body or health.
263  Indeed, despite not having listed rape as 
a grave breach in either the ICTY’s authorizing instrument or the Geneva 
Conventions, the ICTY directly charged rape as a grave breach in at least 
one case.
264
2. OTHER SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS 
APPLICABLE IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
In addition to grave breaches, the other relevant war crimes with 
respect to sexual violence in international armed conflicts are categorized 
as other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in such 
conflicts.  This category includes both broadly construed categories of 
crime (outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and de-
grading treatment)
265 and expressly listed types of sexual violence (rape, 
sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterili-
zation, or “any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave 
breach of the Geneva Conventions”).
266  The material elements for most 
of the latter war crimes are largely consistent with those same acts when 
committed as crimes against humanity, which have been discussed above 
and which will therefore not be repeated here.
267
According to the ICC’s statute, the serious violation of the laws 
and customs of war applicable in international armed conflict of outrages 
                                                          
260 Convention Against Torture, supra note 97, art. 1.
261 DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 183 n.36.
262 Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, ¶ 597; Furundžija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-
T, ¶¶ 163, 171.
263 Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 427 (Feb. 20, 2001); 
Tadić, Appeal Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1-A, ¶ 171.
264 Haradinaj et al., Indictment, Case No. IT-04-84-I.
265 Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 8(2)(b)(xxi).
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upon personal dignity (including humiliating and degrading treatment) 
consists of two elements.  First, the perpetrator must have humiliated, 
degraded, or otherwise violated the dignity of one or more persons.
268  
Second, the severity of the humiliation, degradation, or other violation 
must have been of such a degree as to be generally recognized as an out-
rage upon personal dignity.
269  To clarify the second element, the Ele-
ments of Crimes state that “persons” can include dead persons, that the 
victim need not be personally aware of the existence of the humiliation, 
degradation, or other violation, and that the element takes into account 
the relevant aspects of the victim’s cultural background.
270  These ele-
ments are identical to the non-international armed conflict violation of 
Common Article 3 of outrages upon personal dignity.
271
According to the ICC’s Elements of Crimes, to constitute a grave 
breach or another serious violation of the law and customs of war in an 
international armed conflict, sexual violence must fulfill two cumulative 
criteria.  First, the conduct must have taken place in the context of and 
have been associated with an international armed conflict.
272  Second, 
“the perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict.”
273  No definition of international armed 
conflict is provided in the ICC’s statute or in its Elements of Crimes, 
though the latter does indicate that military occupations fall within inter-
national armed conflict.
274
3. SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF COMMON ARTICLE 3 (NON-INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICTS)
Article 3, which is common to all four Geneva Conventions of 
1949, provides an absolute minimum level of protection for individuals 
not taking active part in hostilities.
275  The ICTY has prosecuted rape and 
other forms of sexual violence as violations of Common Article 3’s pro-
                                                          
268 Rome  Statute,  supra  note  135,  art.  8(2)(b)(xxi);  Elements  of  Crimes,  supra  note  154,  art. 
8(2)(b)(xxi).
269 Rome  Statute,  supra  note  135,  art.  8(2)(b)(xxi);  Elements  of  Crimes,  supra  note  154,  art. 
8(2)(b)(xxi).
270 Elements of Crimes, supra note 154, art. 8(2)(b)(xxi) n.49.
271 Rome  Statute,  supra  note  135,  art.  8(2)(c)(ii);  Elements  of  Crimes,  supra  note  154,  art. 
8(2)(c)(ii).
272 Elements of Crimes, supra note 154, art. 8(2)(e)(vi)-6.
273 Id.
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hibitions on cruel treatment, torture, and outrages upon personal dignity, 
including humiliating and degrading treatment.
276  The ICC’s statute also 
prohibits these acts.
277  The ICTY held that rape, forced fellatio, threats of 
sexual  mutilation,  forced  public  nudity,  and  sexual  exploitation  can 
amount to outrages upon personal dignity.
278
4. OTHER SERIOUS VIOLATIONS OF THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR 
APPLICABLE IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
As in cases involving international armed conflict, in cases in-
volving  non-international armed conflict a residual category of prohi-
bited conduct exists.  This category consists of other serious violations of 
the laws and customs of war.  The ICC’s statute expressly includes with-
in this category “rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced preg-
nancy . . . enforced sterilization, and any other form of sexual violence 
also constituting a serious violation” of Common Article 3.
279  The ma-
terial  and  mental  elements  of  these  crimes  are  the  same  in  non-
international armed conflicts as they are in international armed conflicts, 
which were discussed above.
280  While the ICC’s statute for the first time 
expressly prohibits rape as a stand-alone war crime, rape was nonetheless 
prosecuted as such in the ad hoc Tribunals as well.
281
As to the situational predicate, according to the ICC’s statute, to 
constitute a serious violation of Common Article 3 or another serious vi-
olation of the law and customs of war in a non-international armed con-
flict, sexual violence must fulfill two cumulative criteria.  The first is that 
the conduct must have taken place in the context of and was associated 
with a non-international armed conflict.
282  The second criterion is that 
“the perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the 
existence of an armed conflict.”
283
                                                          
276 Kunarac et al., Judgment, Case No. IT-96-23 & 23/1-T, ¶¶ 400, 405–06.
277 Rome Statute, supra note 135, art. 8(2)(c).
278 DE BROUWER, supra note 6, at 214.
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CONCLUSION
Despite recent advances, international law currently fails to deter 
and punish adequately crimes of sexual violence against men in armed 
conflict.
284  This failure stems in part from the broader geopolitical sys-
tem in which international law operates. International criminal law, in 
particular, is but one option policy-makers at the international level may 
employ to deter and punish those responsible for some of the worst atroc-
ities.  Guided by normative values that promote individual criminal re-
sponsibility, international criminal law operates in a highly politicized 
global environment in which policy-makers may choose to implement 
international criminal law enforcement mechanisms in some situations 
but not in other, seemingly analogous situations.
285  This decision may 
turn,  in  part,  on  the  strategic  interests  of  individual  states,  especially 
states  with  disproportionately  more  power  to  influence  the  decision 
whether to implement such mechanisms.
286
                                                          
284 This is not to suggest that international criminal law adequately protects women from sexual 
violence.  It does not.  As Kelly Dawn Askin states, in appropriately sex-neutral terms:
Despite its insidious prevalence during armed conflict, even the most notorious or 
egregious cases of sexual violence are typically committed with absolute impunity . . . 
an overwhelming majority of perpetrators or facilitators of sexual violence are not 
held accountable for their crimes and few survivors ever receive justice or any other 
form of accountability or reparation, must less medical, psychological, or financial 
redress.
      Askin, The Quest for Post-Conflict Gender Justice, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L  L. 509, 520 
(2003).
285 As one commentator observes:
The subject of international criminal law is benighted by strong elements of paradox.  
On the face of things, the Rule of Law has been strengthened by a proliferation of in-
ternational criminal tribunals . . . But the picture includes negative elements.  In some 
situations, the creation of a Tribunal has appeared to substitute for more effective 
preventive action by the international community . . . Moreover, in the case of the 
ICTY the creation of the Tribunal was associated with a specialized political cam-
paign to destabilize the multi-ethnic State of Yugoslavia, with the ultimate aim of 
bringing about ‘regime change’ in Serbia.
       BROWNLIE, supra note 145, at 575.
286 Some commentators contend that the U.S. intervenes in some humanitarian situations (such as 
the former Yugoslavia) but not in others in order to protect and promote a certain political ideol-
ogy that is predicated, at least in part, on patriarchal notions of guardianship.  Augusta del Zotto 
& Adam Jones, Male-on-Male Sexual Violence in Wartime: Human Rights’ Last Taboo?, paper
presented to the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association (ISA), New Or-
leans,  Louisiana  (March  23-27,  2002),  available at
http://adamjones.freeservers.com/malerape.htm (last visited May 22, 2008).  Del Zotto and Jones 
state:
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Even though its enforcement mechanisms may not be invoked 
frequently, international criminal law provides an important normative 
and legal framework to deter and punish those most responsible for the 
worst atrocities.  Indeed, much of the ad hoc Tribunals’ sexual-violence 
jurisprudence attests to the way international criminal law may develop 
to better, if not perfectly, address the perpetrators of the most egregious 
crimes perpetrated during armed conflict.  Rape is now recognized in in-
ternational criminal law as a severe violation of an individual’s physical 
and mental integrity and his or her sexual autonomy.  This  evolution 
crystallized  only  after  numerous  charges  of  sexual  violence  against 
women—and, to a lesser extent, men—were successfully prosecuted.
287  
Yet, much remains to be done, especially with regard to sexual violence 
against men in conflict settings.
To provide men enhanced protection against sexual violence in 
armed conflict, treaty drafters, jurists, prosecutors, and scholars should 
be cognizant of at least three interrelated issues.  First, they should rec-
ognize how existing international law may reify and reinforce certain ste-
reotypes and norms that may both fuel such violence in the first place 
and lead to its underreporting.  As demonstrated previously, international 
instruments tend to conceptualize sexual violence as something perpe-
trated primarily against women and children.  These conceptions flow 
from harmful stereotypes of femininity and masculinity and from perni-
cious cultural norms regarding sexuality, especially same-sex sexual be-
havior.
288  The initial step in providing enhanced protection must there-
fore be to, at a minimum, explicitly recognize that men also suffer sexual 
violence in conflict settings.
Second, to delegitimize the harmful stereotypes and norms that 
fuel such violence,
289 treaty drafters should use the definition of sexual 
violence laid out earlier, in which sexual violence includes attacks di-
rected at an individual’s perceived, imputed, or actual sexuality.
290  Cri-
minalizing attacks targeting an individual’s sexuality would work toward 
                                                                                                                                 
highly-gendered provision of services conforming to the re-emerging paternal politi-
cal identity.  The U.S. constructs a role as a protective father-figure, rescuing women 
in distress from hostile, sexually aggressive forces.
      Id.  See also BROWNLIE, supra note 145, at 575 (concluding that “[p]olitical considerations, 
power, and patronage will continue to determine who is to be tried for international crimes and 
who [is] not”).
287 See supra Sections III.
288 See supra Sections I.A.
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delegitimizing the destructive stereotypes attending heterosexuality and 
homosexuality in wartime,
291 stereotypes that provide some of the moti-
vation for men (and women) to commit  sexual violence against men.  
Such explicit recognition in international instruments would also put po-
tential perpetrators on notice that sexual violence against men is just as 
serious  a  crime  as  it  is  against  women.    Moreover,  such  recognition 
would provide male victims with a vocabulary to articulate their expe-
riences.  And, as a related effect, explicit recognition would help ensure 
that more humanitarian-aid workers and doctors in the field may recog-
nize and thereby better treat such violence.
Third and last, the postulated jus cogens norm prohibiting rape
292
should encompass all forms of sexual violence committed against both 
sexes in armed conflict and should use a definition of sexual violence 
that includes targeting an individual’s perceived, imputed, or actual sex-
uality.  Such an expansion would reflect the seriousness of these addi-
tional forms of sexual violence, as well as their range.  A norm with a jus 
cogens character may also provide a universal jurisdiction regime against 
perpetrators of all forms of sexual violence in conflict settings.  Addi-
tionally, broadening sexual violence as a jus cogens norm would call at-
tention to an area of international law that has, to date, been neglected by 
international actors.  Lastly, such a broadening could provide male vic-
tims of sexual violence in armed conflict a mechanism to obtain asylum 
or refugee status.
293
These changes are necessary so that men may be rightfully rec-
ognized, alongside women and children, as victims of sexual violence in 
armed conflict.  Unless and until such recognition is obtained, an entire 
category of victims will remain unnoticed while their perpetrators remain 
unpunished.
                                                          
291 See generally Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Lim-
its of the National Law Analogy and the Potential for International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J.
INT’L. L. 39 (2007).
292 See supra Section II.D.
293 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.